Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary
Report 6

Case study of the Lower Hutt Police Area

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Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary

Report 1: *Surveys of Household Burglary part one (2002): Four Police Areas and national data compared*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 2: *Surveys of Household Burglary part two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 3: *Literature review: Police practice in reducing residential burglary*, Dr Sally Harvey, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 4: *Case study of the Manurewa Police Area*, Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 5: *Case study of the Rotorua Police Area*, Tanya Segessenmann and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 6: *Case study of the Lower Hutt Police Area*, Alison Chetwin and Helena Barwick, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 7: *Case study of the Sydenham Police Area*, Dr Sue Carswell and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 8: *Victims of burglary*, Garth Baker and Alison Gray, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 9: *Burglary offenders*, Garth Baker and Alison Gray, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 10: *Overview: Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary*, Alison Chetwin, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Foreword

Burglary is a problem that considerably affects many New Zealand households. From victimisation surveys we know that it can have a profound effect on victims and that householders are concerned about it. Burglary is also costly both to government and to the New Zealand public. Reducing burglary is a key priority in government's Crime Reduction Strategy and an important outcome for the justice sector.

Although recorded burglary rates show a declining trend since the late 1990s, there is considerable room to achieve further reductions. The extensive research published here helps us understand what strategies might be effective in which contexts, as well as the reasons why they are effective. The research has revealed a wealth of practical and workable strategies and initiatives that can be shared from one Police Area to another.

The research project is the result of a highly productive collaboration between the Ministry of Justice and New Zealand Police. We are grateful for the substantial funding support for the project provided by the Cross Departmental Research Pool (CDRP) administered by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology. In the spirit of the CDRP, it has been an excellent example of cross-departmental research on a subject of high priority to government.

The real commitment of the New Zealand Police to reducing crime is evident throughout the ten reports of the Burglary Reduction Research Programme. This substantial series of reports is published to be used in part or in its entirety by front-line Police, as well as managers, advisers and policy makers, all of whom play a variety of roles in the wider justice sector in the effort to reduce burglary.

Belinda Clark
Secretary for Justice

Acknowledgements

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Abbreviations

AFIS   Automatic Fingerprint Identification System
CCTV   closed-circuit television
CIB   Criminal Investigations Branch
Comms   Central Communications Centre
CPC   Community Policing Centre
CSM   Crime Strategy Manager
CYF   Child Youth and Family
DPR   Directed Patrolling Report
ESR   Hamilton Institute of Environmental Science and Research
FGC   Family Group Conference
GDB   General Duties Branch
Hutt Crim   Lower Hutt crime and crash reduction intelligence model
Intel   Intelligence
MO   modus operandi
NIA   National Intelligence Application
OC   Officer in charge
SCAN   Safer Community Action Network
SOCO   Scene of Crime Officer
TRG   Tactical Response Group
YSS   Youth Services Strategy

Executive summary

The Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, has conducted research over three years (2002–2004) on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary. This case study report is the final report examining burglary initiatives undertaken in the Lower Hutt Police Area. Three other Police Areas in New Zealand are also part of the project—Manurewa, Rotorua and Sydenham.

The evaluation involved an in-depth case study approach conducted in the four Police Areas from 2002 to 2004 in an attempt to discover which Police practices work in which contexts and through what mechanisms. The case studies involved:

- a community profile
- interviews with key respondents from the Police, the criminal justice sector and community organisations who had a knowledge of burglary
- Household Burglary Surveys in 2002 and 2004
- interviews with burglars and victims of burglary
- analysis of quantitative data from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice.

National, District and Area burglary reduction strategies

The Police interviewed drew clear links between Government's stated priority to reduce burglary, the strategy to reduce burglary developed by the Office of the Commissioner, the Wellington District strategy, and the Lower Hutt Area burglary reduction strategies.

Burglary reduction remains a key strategic goal for the Government and Police nationally. Until 2003, Government policing priorities were translated into Police objectives through the *New Zealand Police Strategic Plan to 2006* and the annual *New Zealand Police Departmental Forecast Report*. In 2002–2003 the Departmental Forecast Report was replaced by a Statement of Intent.

The national priorities are communicated to the District Commanders within these documents and by means of the Police Executive Conference. District Commanders have flexibility and discretion in developing local strategies, and are held accountable by means of an annual District appraisal based on specific performance measures. At District level, the priorities of the *Strategic Plan to 2006* are carried through each year into the Wellington District Business Plan, which is the agreement with government on what the District will deliver. One section of the business plan is devoted to burglary.

Each Police Area has considerable autonomy in developing strategies to meet burglary reduction targets. This report discusses burglary reduction strategies in place in Lower Hutt from 2002 to 2004.

Policing strategies can be broadly characterised as focused on offenders, victims, locations or property. Several burglary reduction initiatives in place through the evaluation period had a broad focus across offender, victim, location, and property strategies.

Cross-focused initiatives and practices

Tactical response group

Set up in 2000, the Tactical Response Group began as a unit of three experienced constables who worked under the direction of the Crime Strategy Manager. Tactical Response Group officers were selected for their experience of frontline policing and their ability to gather information from offenders and their associates and had three distinct portfolios—second-hand dealers, burglary and drugs. The Tactical Response Group was set up as a dedicated burglary squad to bridge a gap between General Duties Branch sections and the Criminal Investigations Branch.

Throughout the evaluation period the Tactical Response Group was a central component of Lower Hutt's burglary reduction strategy. The Group was perceived as highly effective by other members of the Police, largely because it was made up of dedicated and hard-working officers who were thought to have the right approach and experience for the work they were doing. The Tactical Response Group worked in plain clothes, was flexible and responsive, and could be deployed wherever the need was seen to be the greatest. A further strength was the good relationships the group fostered with other Police staff, which enabled strong information flows and removed any risk of it being seen as an elite group.

Crime Strategy Manager

The Crime Strategy Manager is a senior sergeant position created in 2000. The role was to monitor, develop, and implement strategies for reducing crime, and in the two years prior to the evaluation the primary focus had been reducing burglary. The Crime Strategy Manager had responsibility for developing or prioritising many initiatives including proactive weeks, bail checks, offender targeting, directed patrolling, second-hand dealer liaison, and the collection of DNA and fingerprints, as well as monitoring routine aspects of burglary response such as attendances and clearances.

Police staff interviewed for this case study saw the strengths of the Crime Strategy Manager position as that:

- it promoted crime reduction as a common goal among all sections of staff
- the Area Controller supported the position by making it clear that the Crime Strategy Manager had the authority to call staff from other units to implement operations or initiatives

- as the acknowledged leader of the Area's crime reduction effort, the Crime Strategy Manager obtained strong cooperation from other staff

- both people appointed to the position were experienced and respected officers.

Tactics (Intelligence)

Analysis of Police intelligence plays a crucial role in the current approach to policing. The Lower Hutt intelligence group—named Tactics—was a hub for the Area's burglary reduction strategies and a key provider and receiver of information. Lower Hutt had a well-developed Intel system for several years prior to the evaluation and had become a model for other Areas. It had also been the first to use some software applications, such as MAPS.

In both Wellington District and Lower Hutt Area, intelligence was seen to provide clear direction and coordination to the policing work and to crime reduction strategies, and Area support was visible in the extra resources to assist with data entry given to Tactics whenever possible.

Throughout the evaluation period, optimum effectiveness of Tactics was hampered by a lack of consistency between Areas and Districts in how information was recorded and entered into NIA. Staff absences and inadequate data entry staff led to Tactics constantly feeling on the verge of being overwhelmed by the quantity of incoming information, and lacking the capacity to undertake strategic analysis. Police staff at all levels had high expectations of the strategic analysis that Tactics could deliver to the burglary reduction effort but recognised that the specialised analytical skills required were not always available within the unit, nor was training in strategic analysis readily available.

Crime Focus

Lower Hutt adopted the Crime Focus week in 2003. This involved identifying a particular type of criminal activity to be the crime focus for a two-week period and requiring all officers, from constables to the Area Controller, to make some form of contribution to reducing that type of crime.

All staff saw the Crime Focus strategy as having significant advantages. It was easy to implement, and because it drew together traditional policing practices of observation and notings, directed patrolling, and targeting known offenders, staff took little convincing of its value. As it drew on current practice, no additional training was required. Another perceived advantage was that the Crime Focus involved every member of staff in the Lower Hutt Police Area and staff believed it created a sense of ownership of the problem of crime. The chief disadvantages to the Crime Focus were that activities were additional to officers' regular work, and there was no mechanism for accountability.

Crime and crash reduction intelligence model

In August 2004, Lower Hutt Police Area introduced the Crime and crash reduction intelligence model, which introduced greater focus, urgency and accountability to policing priorities. The model has three key elements:

- quarterly forecasting of policing priorities

- analysis of District and Area intelligence data to identify patterns of offending

- allocating responsibility for specific policing strategies and activities to individuals and groups at a daily 'tasking', along with a date on which progress will be reviewed.

Although the Crime and crash reduction intelligence model was still in its early stages at the end of the evaluation period, Police interviewed identified leadership, urgency and accountability as the main strengths behind the model.

Offender-focused initiatives and practices

Offender-focused initiatives and practices are those that aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by apprehending or curtailing the activities of those who commit burglary. Several offender-focused initiatives and practices were being used in Lower Hutt throughout the evaluation period, including bail checks, targeting offenders, DNA samples and fingerprints, scene of crime investigation, and the Youth Services Strategy.

The Youth Services Strategy, designed to improve and coordinate the way Police dealt with young offenders, was implemented in 2003 in response to the recognition that much property crime was being committed by young people. The Youth Services Strategy tried to ensure that work with young offenders and young people at risk of offending was based on a sound understanding of best practice. It did this by:

- aligning the work of those groups within Police that deal primarily with young people

- increasing the immediacy of response to young people committing crime

- educating officers throughout the Police about how to work most effectively with young offenders.

In order to be fully implemented, the Youth Services Strategy required some organisational changes which were only completed late in the evaluation period.

Victim-focused initiatives

Neighbourhood Support, the provision of security advice and Victim Support were all in place in Lower Hutt from 2002 to 2004. All were highly regarded by Police as ways of strengthening the relationships between Police and the community. Neighbourhood Support in particular was driven by a strong and committed coordinator who worked hard to develop two-way communication flows between the Police and members of the community.

Location- and property-focused initiatives

Liaison with second-hand dealers was seen by Lower Hutt Police as making an important contribution to burglary reduction. This was the responsibility of the Tactical Response Group, whose members regularly visited second-hand dealers and established relationships within which information could be exchanged. Second-hand dealers interviewed appreciated the collegial approach taken by Police, and the responsiveness of the Tactical Response Group.

Crime data and the Lower Hutt Police approach

Total recorded burglary in Lower Hutt reduced by 47.2% between 1997 and 2004, compared with a national reduction of 33.7%. Dwelling burglaries in Lower Hutt reduced by 54.3% over the same period compared with a national reduction of 32.1%.

During interviews Police identified an integrated approach, strong leadership, performance management, and openness to new strategies as strengths to the overall burglary reduction effort in Lower Hutt. Some structures and initiatives, such as the Tactical Response Group, the work of Tactics and Neighbourhood Support were also identified as strengths.

1 Introduction

1.1 The objectives of the research

The Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, has conducted research over three years (2002–2004) on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing burglary. This case study report is the final report examining burglary initiatives undertaken in the Lower Hutt Police Area. Three other Police Areas in New Zealand are also part of the project—Manurewa, Rotorua and Sydenham.

The objectives of the research are to:

1. examine Police best practice, including Police initiatives in partnership with communities, in relation to residential burglary reduction; to understand which practices are effective in which contexts and why

2. gain an understanding of some wider contextual factors that influence the effectiveness of burglary initiatives

3. examine effectiveness in relation to the incidence of burglary, the resolution of burglary, public satisfaction and perceptions of safety

4. examine any unintended effects of burglary initiatives, such as displacement.

1.2 Evaluation methodology

This section gives an overview of the methodology used for the evaluation.

1.2.1 Study design

This evaluation aims to find out about effective burglary reduction initiatives in order to communicate best practice to Police and community partners. The design recognises that different environmental factors—such as demographics, geography, crime rate, community involvement, and local Police organisational structures—could affect the development, implementation and effectiveness of burglary initiatives. The design therefore involved an in-depth case study approach conducted in four Police Areas from 2002 to 2004.

The evaluation attempts to discover what works in which contexts and by what mechanisms. This type of design is known as realistic evaluation, and was developed by researchers

working on various crime prevention evaluations sponsored by the British Home Office in the 1990s.[1]

1.2.2 Police Area selection

The four Police Areas were selected based on a scoping study conducted in 2001 that took into consideration:

- environmental factors

- what could be learned from each Police Area

- the Police Area's willingness to take part in the study.

Police Areas with middle to high burglary rates and a range of different environmental factors were chosen so that lessons learned from these study sites would be informative for other Police Areas.

1.2.3 Conceptual framework for burglary reduction initiatives

In any community, a range of initiatives is likely to be in place to address and prevent burglary. Initiatives range from specific Police interventions, such as targeting offenders, to interventions delivered to victims, such as security advice, through to more widely focused interventions, such as programmes for at-risk young people. The conceptual framework for the evaluation organised particular initiatives under the following categories:

- 'hot' offenders—initiatives which targeted known burglars

- 'hot' victims—initiatives which aimed to increase the security of victims

- 'hot' locations—initiatives which involved targeted patrolling of locations with high burglary concentrations

- 'hot' property—initiatives which aimed to reduce the market for burgled goods and identify stolen property.

1.2.4 Information collection methods

The study design collected information on burglary reduction initiatives and explored the mechanisms that led to burglary reduction through a range of methods. For example, enforcing bail conditions for known burglars might be expected to lead to a reduction in repeat offending through the mechanism of incapacitation. Using a range of methods allowed for verification of the results because if diverse kinds of data lead to the same conclusions, then more confidence can be placed in the validity and reliability of those conclusions.

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[1] Pawson, R. and Tilley, N. 1997. *Realistic Evaluation.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

The information collection methods for this report included:

- Community profile
  - demographic and socio-economic data on each Police Area
  - general information on crime in the Police Area
  - identification of contextual factors, including risk, and protective factors that affected the incidence of burglary.
- Interviews
  - semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with key respondents from the Police, criminal justice sector and community organisations who had knowledge of burglary
  - some key Police staff were interviewed more than once
- Household Burglary Surveys 2002 and 2004—a survey of 500 households was conducted in each of the Police Areas in both 2002 and 2004 to find out:
  - fear of crime
  - burglary victimization
  - security measures people use
  - satisfaction with Police practice.

  The surveys were conducted face-to-face with one householder aged 16 years or over.
- Interviews with burglars and victims of burglary in each of the four Police Areas were conducted in 2003. Analysis of these interviews is presented in an overview report and separate reports.
- Quantitative data from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice were analysed to assess the effectiveness of burglary initiatives by examining burglary incidence rates resolution rates. Unintended effects of burglary initiatives such as displacement to other Police Areas or types of offences were examined.

1.2.5   Ethics and project management

The evaluation proposal was submitted to the Justice Sector Research Group for ethical review. The ethical standards of the Australasian Evaluation Society and the Association of Social Science Researchers have been followed. An advisory group consisting of representatives of key stakeholder agencies provided advice on the design, conduct and management of the project and reviewed draft reports.

1.2.6   Reporting

In addition to the Police Area case studies, the full study includes reports on interviews with victims and offenders, reports on the Household Burglary Surveys in 2002 and 2004, a review

of the international literature, and an overview report that analyses all information gathered over the three-year evaluation period.

1.3   The report

This report starts with a brief community profile to provide information about the Lower Hutt Police Area, as contextual factors are important to take into consideration when examining what works and how it works in a particular environment. The community profile gives an overview of demographic and geographic information. Section Three looks at general crime prevention initiatives indirectly related to burglary, such as youth programmes and drug rehabilitation schemes, which provide contextual information on what is being done in the community. The Police structures relating to crime reduction in general, such as the work of Youth Aid and community constables, are then briefly described.

Sections 4 to 8 describe the burglary initiatives according to their focus on offenders, victims, location or property. Cross-focused initiatives, which combine a number of policing strategies, are examined first, for example the work of the Tactical Response Group. Initiatives in place at the time of the first data collection in 2002 are fully described. These are updated with any changes or new information gathered in 2003 and 2004, and any new initiatives introduced in those years are described in full.

Section 9 looks at justice and community sector responses to burglary. Section 10 compares Lower Hutt crime data to national crime data, and the final section of the report summarises the findings of the case study and identifies the strengths and barriers to the burglary reduction effort in Lower Hutt.

2 Profile of the Lower Hutt Police Area

With a population of 95,472, the Lower Hutt Police Area sits within Hutt City, the ninth largest city in New Zealand. The population is predominantly Maori or European, but a significant number of Asian and Pacific peoples also live in the Area. Tangata Whenua are Te Atiawa ki Te Awakairangi, with marae at Waiwhetu and Orongomai in Upper Hutt. The traditional industry is manufacturing, but specialised telecommunications, transport and oil business are important in the local economy. Geographical features are important in determining the nature of the community, with the Hutt River dividing the area, which consists of a valley floor bounded by hills to the east and west and the Wellington Harbour to the south.

2.1 Census and other data

This section draws some key comparisons between the population of Lower Hutt Police Area (as at the 2001 Census) with New Zealand's total population, focusing on:

- ethnicity
- age
- employment status
- educational qualifications
- household composition
- families with children
- personal income
- benefit income.

2.1.1 Ethnicity and age

Lower Hutt's population has a higher proportion of Pacific peoples (9.8% compared with 6.7%), a slightly higher proportion of Maori (15.6% compared with 14.1%), and a slightly lower proportion of European ethnic groups (76.6% compared with 78.2%) than the total New Zealand population.

The age distribution of the Lower Hutt population is very similar to the age distribution of the New Zealand population, although it has a slightly higher proportion of people (37%) 25 and under and a lower proportion of older people aged 60 or more.

2.1.2   Socio-economic status

Research undertaken by the Family Centre Social Policy Research Unit in 2002 and published by the Hutt City Council shows that overall, residents of Hutt City have a higher than average quality of life compared with the rest of New Zealand. However, some areas within the city are among the most deprived and some areas are among the least deprived in New Zealand. The areas among the most deprived range from Naenae South to Taita North, while the areas among the least deprived include Hutt Central, Woburn, Eastbourne, and the Western Hills from Haywards-Manor Park to Korokoro.

2.1.3   Income

A smaller proportion of people aged 15 and over in Lower Hutt (37.6%) had incomes under $20,000 than people in the whole of New Zealand (42.1%). In Lower Hutt 19.5% of the population had incomes over $40,000, compared with 16.6% nationally.

The proportions of people receiving government benefits, as well as the types of benefits they receive, are very similar to national patterns. Since 1996, the number of benefits paid as a proportion of the working age population has been quite steady.

2.1.4   Education and employment

The education profile of people living in the Lower Hutt Police Area closely matches the education profile of New Zealand as a whole. Just under one-quarter of the population have no qualification, and a further one-third have a secondary school qualification as their highest qualification.

A higher proportion of people in Lower Hutt aged 15 and over are in full-time paid employment, a slightly higher proportion are unemployed, and a lower proportion are not in the labour force in comparison with New Zealand as a whole.

Within the Wellington Region, using New Zealand Employment Service registration data, Hutt City had the second highest proportion of unemployed between 1993 and 2001. New Zealand European residents were much less likely to be unemployed than Maori, Pacific peoples, and other ethnic groups. Unemployment was concentrated among younger age groups, between 15 and 29. Unemployment rates had increased from 1997 to 2000, but fell in 2001.

2.2   Householders' perceptions of crime in Lower Hutt

Household Survey (2002, 2004)

In 2002, significantly fewer survey respondents from Lower Hutt thought that crime was a problem in their neighbourhood (41%) compared to the average of the other Areas surveyed. Of those who thought crime was a problem, most (85%) considered burglary to be a problem, although this may be partly because this was known to be a survey about burglary. The next most likely crimes to be mentioned were vandalism (27%), car theft (19%), dangerous driving (18%), petty theft (17%) and theft from cars (16%). In 2004, the proportion who thought crime was problem had fallen slightly (38%) and was the lowest of the four case study areas.

In 2002, significantly fewer respondents (11%) thought there had been more crime in the last twelve months than before, compared to the average of the other Areas surveyed. In 2004, the proportion of respondents in Lower Hutt who thought there had been more crime in the last 12 months than before increased to 16%, in contrast to Manurewa and Rotorua, where the proportion of respondents who thought there had been more crime recently actually declined.

In 2004, as in 2002, participants Lower Hutt and Sydenham were less likely to be very worried about being the victim of various crimes, including burglary, than those in Rotorua or Manurewa.

2.3   Perceptions of those interviewed

All of those interviewed for this case study were asked whether they perceived any particular groups in the community were more at risk of being burglary offenders or victims.

2.3.1   Perceived risk factors for victimisation

In general, those interviewed believed all groups and areas were at risk of victimisation, regardless of socio-economic status. However, there seemed to be some exceptions. Some believed that the geographical features of the area made some of the hill suburbs, which were less accessible on foot and which had only one road in or out, less vulnerable to burglary.

Some groups were thought to be more vulnerable targets for burglary, in particular new immigrants, the elderly living in poor communities, and those who could not afford security systems. Those who lived in lower socio-economic areas where offenders tended to live were also thought to be more vulnerable targets.

2.3.2   Perceived risk factors for offending

A range of risk factors was identified which might lead particular groups to become burglary offenders. In general, because the Lower Hutt Police Area has natural boundaries defined by the geography, it was thought that those who offended locally also tended to live within the area, at least for the period of time during which they committed offences. There was general

agreement that a small number of offenders were responsible for a high proportion of offences in the area.

Risk factors for offending identified in interviews included the following.

- The expansion of the Rimutaka Prison close to the Police Area meant both that more released inmates were settling in the area, and that more inmates' families and associates were settling in the area.

- Pockets with a high proportion of children and young people tended to result in more opportunistic burglaries during school holidays.

- School truants and those expelled from schools were at risk of committing burglaries for cash and because of a lack of constructive activity. Certain schools managed this problem better than others.

- There are large tracts of Housing New Zealand housing where poorer people congregate. In pockets within these areas gangs had established, with the result that they became transient communities as families sought relocation to safer areas outside of the Hutt Valley. This reduced the protective influence of a stable community. Dislocated urban Maori who lacked the influence and support of extended families were also known to have settled in these areas.

- Organised gangs and ethnic gangs were established in pockets in the Area. While they were less likely to lead young people directly to offending than they once did, indirectly their involvement in drugs led to the commission of burglaries.

- A growing drug scene, which required payment for supplies with cash or property, provided a motivation for burglary. Many burglars were thought to be major intravenous drug users. A growing methamphetamine industry was causing concern, not only because it created a need for access to cash and goods, but also because of the drug-induced mindset it produced. Police interviewed late in 2003 linked increased rates of burglary to a huge increase in the demand for methamphetamines.

- A small number of neglectful and deprived families produced young people at risk of burglary and other offending.

3 Police strategies and crime reduction structures

3.1 Police crime reduction strategies

The Police interviewed saw clear links between Government's stated priority to reduce burglary, the strategy to reduce burglary developed by the Office of the Commissioner, the Wellington District strategy, and the Lower Hutt Area burglary reduction strategies.

3.1.1 National strategies

Burglary reduction remains a key strategic goal for the Government and Police nationally. Until 2003, Government policing priorities were translated into Police objectives through the *New Zealand Police Strategic Plan to 2006* and the annual *New Zealand Police Departmental Forecast Report*. In 2002–2003 the Departmental Forecast Report was replaced by a Statement of Intent.

These documents also reflect the priorities of other government strategies such as the Crime Reduction Strategy, which ensures Police goals are aligned with the goals of other partner agencies. The *Strategic Plan to 2006* identified two strategic goals—community safety and crime reduction. It included a commitment to achieve national targets for violence, youth safety, organised crime, burglary and road safety.

The national priorities are communicated to the District Commanders within these documents and by means of the Police Executive Conference. The Policing Development Group in the Office of the Commissioner provides information and support for the development of District strategies for meeting the national priorities. However, District Commanders have considerable flexibility and discretion in developing local strategies. District Commanders are held accountable by means of an annual District appraisal based on specific performance measures. In the case of residential burglary, these measures are in the form of population-based recorded District rates and resolution rates. In 2002, the Wellington Policing Development Manager stated:

> *Probably the biggest thing for us that drives the policing of burglary and reduction is the Departmental Forecast Report, because that [has] our agreed objectives that we know we've got to meet. Then it's further driven through the District Commander's performance measures…they are held very much accountable…*

The Statement of Intent sets targets for reductions in the number of burglaries and for increases in burglary clearance rates. When these are prepared for each District, account is taken of factors which impact on clearance rates, such as transience, and targets vary slightly between Districts.

The other reported impact on policing from a national level was the increased attention given to national security following the international terrorism of 2001. Police Areas, which were already understaffed, had their human resource further depleted by the assignment of staff to this priority, as well as to the additional Police presence required in Auckland during the America's Cup regatta. This was most strongly a feature of 2003.

3.1.2   District strategies

At District level, the priorities of the *Strategic Plan to 2006* are carried through each year into the Wellington District Business Plan, which is the agreement with government on what the District will deliver. One section of the business plan is devoted to burglary reduction, although it contains a number of other priorities as well, including most notably road traffic policing. A reduction in repeated family violence was added as a priority area in 2003.

In 2002, the Wellington District Commander promoted a business excellence model in pursuit of policing excellence within the District. This overlaid on the business plan a number of criteria, including:

- leadership

- strategic planning

- community networks

- processes and systems

- human resources

- results.

The most important application of the business excellence model for the burglary reduction strategy was the strengthening, during 2002, of leadership from the District Tactical Intelligence Group.

In 2003, the business excellence model and intelligence (Intel)-led policing continued to be the key District-level strategies designed to reduce burglary. The Policing Development Manager carried significant responsibility for implementing the strategies. A District-level burglary squad was planned for 2003, but short staffing in Lower Hutt meant they were unable to release officers to the squad, and what had originally been planned as a District initiative tuned out to be largely a Wellington Area initiative.

In 2004, a new District Commander was appointed to Wellington. The District Commander reviewed a number of existing structures and processes, and indicated his intention to strengthen a more integrated whole-of-District policing approach. At the time of interview, a review of District-wide Intel was almost complete, and the District Commander was optimistic that the findings would clarify the distinction between technical Intel and strategic Intel in a way that enabled both to perform more effectively. The emphasis of the *Wellington District Business Plan for Burglary Reduction 2004–2005* was on increasing consistency and sustainability in good policing practice, and clarifying performance indicators and accountability.

Performance management is an important feature of the implementation of the district business plan. The monthly district management conference is the key forum for performance management. The District Tactical Intelligence Group produces monthly statistics for each Area for consideration by the district management team, comprising the five Area Controllers, the District Commander and the District Policing Development Manager. This provides an opportunity for the District Commander to comment directly on performance and for Area Controllers to discuss strategies.

Areas are also kept informed about their performance in relation to national priorities by means of a weekly scorecard. For dwelling burglaries, Area targets are set for a weekly and annual recorded burglary count and expected resolution rate. Performance in relation to targets is depicted with corresponding figures overlaid with 'traffic light' colours.

3.1.3 Lower Hutt Area strategies

In the Area Controller's view, the key aspect of developing the Area's burglary strategy in 2000 was making burglary the primary focus for the Area. The aim was to ensure that every member of the Area staff owned burglary as their problem. The strategy itself was created by bringing together a committee from staff in a range of different roles from within the Area. In 2002, this approach was manifest through Operation Madrid, which gradually introduced changed structures, initiatives, and practices to reduce burglary. This included the creation of a Crime Strategy Manager (CSM) position, a Tactical Response Group, Q-cars, and enhanced practices such as the use of:

- Intel
- bail checks
- offender targeting
- proactive weeks
- DNA sampling and fingerprints
- directed patrolling
- second-hand dealer liaison
- partnership with Neighbourhood Support.

In 2003, the structures, initiatives and practices identified above were still in evidence, but they were no longer seen or described as Operation Madrid, as they were fully integrated into daily policing and the push towards collective ownership of the burglary problem had intensified into the Crime Focus.

All staff interviewed in 2002 and 2003 saw the weekly crime meeting as central to the ongoing implementation of the burglary reduction strategy. Members of staff from all levels and stations attended. Although the meeting had a range of purposes, a part of the meeting was set aside to inform staff of the burglary reduction effort in the previous week and the proposed targets or special operations for the forthcoming week. Information was presented

on their performance on burglary reduction activities, the recorded burglaries, and the arrests for the previous week. In 2004, the ownership, urgency and accountability of the weekly crime meetings had been further intensified into the daily 'taskings', which involved allocation of priority tasks to individuals or sections, with an accountability mechanism to check whether tasks had been completed.

A comprehensive performance management approach was in place in the Lower Hutt Area throughout the evaluation period. Mechanisms changed through the three years, but the key features, such as regular measurement of performance in relation to crime trends and sectional activities, remained the same throughout. The Area Controller said:

> *So we well and truly measure everything. The sections are well aware that everything's measured. These documents are all in the shared directory, so each supervisor or each staff member can access it. And obviously the Sergeants use it for their own performance measurements as well.*

3.2   Police crime reduction structures

In 2002, at the beginning of the evaluation period, three structures in particular in Lower Hutt Area could be seen as having a focus on general crime reduction, including a reduction in burglaries. These were:

- Community Policing
- Youth Aid Section
- the Iwi Liaison officer.

Each of these will be described in turn, as part of the context within which the burglary reduction strategies were operating.

3.2.1   Community policing

Lower Hutt Police Area has Community Policing Centres (CPCs) in Naenae, Wainouiomata and Petone. Each Centre has an Officer in Charge (OC), Community Constables, and Youth Aid Officers. In addition, Wainouiomata has a Youth at Risk programme, emergency response units, and Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB). Wainouiomata has a 24-hour policing service, while Naenae and Petone operate during business hours. Staff interviewed at two of these centres believed that the community policing approach was able to be more proactive in reducing crime than the emergency response service run centrally. Activities that were carried out from the Centres included:

- school liaison
- foot patrols in trouble spot areas such as malls and amusement parlours
- vehicle patrols in the suburbs
- monitoring drug houses

- returning truants to school.

Community policing was thought to be effective in reducing crime for a number of reasons.

- Community Police had a greater knowledge of local recidivist offenders and their families, both youth and adults, and as such provided valuable information for the CIB and other centralised staff.
- Local residents felt more comfortable reporting offences or suspicious activity at a local centre, and thus CPCs generated more reporting.
- CPCs meant that policing was more visible in suburban areas; this increased perceptions of the certainty of detection, and also fostered perceptions of community safety.
- CPCs tended to house more experienced and stable staff, allowing for a longer-term picture of policing issues in the area; more of the work was done informally.
- Community Police could build a rapport with local offenders on bail reporting etc., and this assisted with managing local recidivist offenders.

Structural changes to the Lower Hutt Police Area were undertaken in 2004. A review of CPCs led to the staff from two CPCs being combined at one location, freeing the other location to house all Youth Services staff together. The rationale for these changes was that, reorganised in this way, both community policing and Youth Services would:

- have more direct access to their resources
- improve coordination
- be better placed to accept the taskings and accountability required under the Crime and Crash Reduction Intelligence Model.

At the end of the evaluation period the Area Controller reported that the changes had been very effective for the Youth Services staff but that staffing shortages had hampered the restructuring of CPCs taking full effect.

3.2.2 Youth Aid

Lower Hutt Area had a team of six Youth Aid Officers stationed in Naenae, Petone, Lower Hutt and Wainouiomata. In addition to this, further officers were appointed to Youth at Risk programmes in Wainouiomata. Their roles encompassed:

- liaising with schools, educational programmes in schools, ad hoc talks with specific classes
- regular 'rounding up' of truants and returning them to school
- diverting of first offenders and finding and supervising of appropriate community work
- referring of young offenders and at-risk young people to programmes
- responding to parent requests for help with their teenagers

- acting as the Police representative at FGCs and at times monitoring FGC plans

- visiting at-risk families

- diverting young people from tagging by arranging for them to paint murals under supervision.

Youth Aid Officers referred young people to a range of programmes, including:

- alternative schools and activity centres

- Drug Arm

- church youth groups

- local marae

- youth development camps.

They also developed and conducted some programmes themselves, such as:

- Blue Light discos

- triathlons

- touch rugby

- fitness tests

- culture performances in schools

- occasionally camps.

The Youth at Risk programmes worked more intensively with one or two at-risk families, meeting needs such as developing parenting skills and assistance with employment, linking families with their iwi groups. They tended to work with very young people at risk and their families, who were often referred from schools.

Youth Aid Officers believed their service worked on a range of levels. They believed that:

- intervening early prevented an escalation in offending behaviour

- keeping children out of the system prevented an escalation of offending

- keeping young people occupied and developing their life skills prevented offending

- working with whole families tried to ensure that young people lived with more positive role models

- developing rapport and trust with families of young offenders generally assisted policing.

In 2003 and 2004 the Youth Services Strategy (YSS) was initiated and gained momentum in Lower Hutt. The strategy clarified and coordinated Police work with young people, and

brought significant changes to the work of Youth Aid in particular, which are discussed in Section 5.6.

3.2.3   Iwi Liaison officer

In 2002 the Iwi Liaison officer for the Lower Hutt Police Area was liaising between Maori and the Police in relation to policing and things Maori. The role was one of educating, networking and establishing relationships with key Maori providers in the community and changing the face of policing amongst the Maori community.

The Iwi Liaison officer had also initiated other innovative programmes intended to lead to crime reduction.

The work of the Iwi Liaison officer was frustrated by ill health and staff vacancies in both 2003 and 2004.

4 Cross-focused initiatives and practices

Policing strategies can be broadly characterised as focused on offenders, victims, locations or property. Each of these groups of strategies is described in more detail in later chapters of this report. Several burglary reduction initiatives in place through the evaluation period had a broad focus across offender, victim, location, and property strategies. The following positions, practices and initiatives in place in the Lower Hutt Area between 2002 and 2004 were 'cross-focused'.

4.1 Tactical Response Group

Set up in 2000, the Tactical Response Group (TRG) began as a unit of three experienced constables who worked under the direction of the CSM. In 2002, the Area Controller and CSM indicated this group was one of the most important burglary reduction strategies in Lower Hutt Police Area.

In 2002, TRG had three distinct portfolios: second-hand dealers, burglary, and gangs. As described in section 8.1, the unit had put a lot of time into developing relationships with second-hand dealers, and was receiving good information which sometimes led to the resolution of burglaries. The TRG officers had been selected for their experience of frontline policing and their ability to gather information from offenders and their associates.

> *Because we were street cops originally, we haven't lost the knowledge of our offenders and their associates…There's no point in locking yourself away in an office and not keeping in touch with offenders. We still get out and trawl the streets for offenders when we've got a spare moment, when we're going to and from jobs.*

The work with gangs had also developed into 'a good working relationship', despite the fact that TRG had been responsible for the prosecution of many gang members and associates. While much of the work was drug related, there was a direct link to burglary in that many younger burglars were from gangs, and gangs received a lot of stolen property.

The TRG frequently offered to help out in other sections such as CIB, assist at a traffic accident, or work with General Duties Branch (GDB) staff at the end of a shift. While they were careful not to become too involved in the work of other sections, their willingness to help both allowed them to gather new information relating to burglary while on other duties, and created goodwill that resulted in more information being passed to them by other officers. Throughout the evaluation period TRG was well regarded by other officers.

In 2003, TRG was still a central component of Lower Hutt's burglary reduction strategy. However, the understaffing of the Lower Hutt Police Area was affecting the work of TRG in two main ways. They were no longer able to put together special operations with the assistance of GDB staff, and the Intel on which they relied to do their job effectively was less forthcoming, with fewer staff in the station, and those who were in post so busy that they couldn't take the time to pass information on.

In 2004, TRG was further strengthened by the addition of a sergeant and another constable, increasing the team to five officers. Many respondents indicated that the addition of a sergeant would provide the team with leadership that had been needed. The team was still operating proactively, and reducing burglary continued to be a major focus. The CSM described TRG's contribution to burglary reduction in these words:

> *They are an immediate response group as opposed to an investigation group, and if we have a problem or a spike in our crime rate or identify one person that may be committing multiple offences, then they go hunting basically…they are there if we have a problem now, let's sort it out. They are adaptable in that I can go to them and tell them next week you are working these days, these hours, I need you here—this is where the problem is. They are not on a set roster, they are basically there to bend and sway with our requirements or the environment's requirements.*

4.1.1 Rationale for the Tactical Response Group

The Area Controller described TRG as the only dedicated resource proactively targeting burglary.

The TRG was set up as a dedicated burglary squad to bridge a gap between GDB sections and the CIB. CIB tended to be absorbed in the investigation and prosecution of serious and violent crime, and the GDB staff was often fully stretched offering emergency response, resulting in a slow response to burglary cases with a clear lead to an offender.

Almost all Police interviewed in the Lower Hutt Area throughout the evaluation spoke of the outstanding work done by TRG. They were seen to have had a high impact on reducing burglaries, primarily through a high number of arrests, successful prosecutions and clearances for burglary. Their targeting of repeat offenders was thought to be a deterrent to offending. However, the members of TRG were clear that if they could not prevent a person offending, having them move out of Lower Hutt was an acceptable outcome.

There were some unavoidable consequences of the work of the unit. The numbers of GDB staff had been reduced by three in order to provide positions for the TRG, and other types of crime, such as drug offending, did not get the same resourcing.

4.1.2 Barriers to the Tactical Response Group

Barriers to maximum effectiveness of the TRG were identified as:

- they could be occupied for several weeks following special operations putting the case together for court, which meant that other work had to go on hold

- there were not enough staff to follow up on all of the cases, or do all of the work that could be done to reduce burglary

- the team sometimes lacked cohesion and direction—this barrier was addressed in 2004 by the appointment of a sergeant

- the addition of new responsibilities (for example checking enforcement of liquor licences) took time away from burglary reduction activity.

4.1.3   Strengths of the Tactical Response Group

The strengths of the TRG identified in interviews were:

- the right types of experienced people had been selected for the unit—the members of the TRG had a lengthy service between them and the unit was seen as dedicated and hard-working

- the unit was primarily dedicated to burglary reduction and ring–fenced, so the members could not be diverted to other work

- the unit had a great deal of flexibility and there were 'no real boundaries' to the work

- the unit was responsive and able to take immediate action where there was a strong lead

- working on the streets in plain clothes was seen as a huge advantage

- good relationships with other Police staff meant that there was a strong flow of information between them and TRG—they were not seen as an elite group

- the unit provided good modelling and a training ground for less experienced staff.

One experienced officer said this:

We feed staff into them on a rotational basis when we can afford the staff, which is a brilliant training call for us because it is letting the guys see another side of things, another way to do things. It keeps them fresh and they are actually getting a taste of success—for want of a better phrase…Very rarely would we lock up a burglar on section these days, but down there it's a daily occurrence.

4.2   Crime Strategy Manager

The CSM is a senior sergeant position created in 2000. The role was to monitor, develop, and implement strategies for reducing crime, and in the two years prior to the evaluation the primary focus had been reducing burglary. The position had originally been created by reducing the complement of senior sergeants, but by 2002 the CSM had become a permanent authorised position in the Area.

Tactics, TRG and the Q-car positions reported directly to the CSM. The CSM had responsibility for developing or prioritising many of the initiatives discussed so far in this report, including:

- proactive weeks

- bail checks

- offender targeting

- directed patrolling

- second-hand dealer liaison

- the collection of DNA and fingerprints.

The CSM also monitored routine aspects of burglary response such as attendances and clearances.

In 2002, a further initiative undertaken by the CSM was the proactive use of the media. This included the local community newspaper, the Hutt News, and radio, including the local Maori radio station. The CSM met regularly with Hutt News journalists, resulting in weekly articles about:

- local crime

- Police actions in response to crime

- ways the community could assist

- information such as security advice.

In 2003, the CSM was an integral component of the burglary reduction effort in Lower Hutt. However, the shortage of staff had resulted in the CSM taking on some additional responsibilities, thereby somewhat reducing the position's dedicated focus on burglary. The establishment of closed circuit television (CCTV) monitoring areas of the Lower Hutt CBD, a major achievement in 2003, was driven by the CSM.

In 2004, a new CSM was appointed, and the Area Controller made a deliberate decision to refocus the position on crime strategy and remove some of the other responsibilities that had been subsumed into the position as it evolved over time. The new CSM, who came with recent CIB experience, was charged with developing and monitoring the strategies and tactics to address current crime problems. With the advent of the Lower Hutt crime and crash reduction intelligence model (Hutt Crim) it was up to the CSM to determine the daily taskings. The CSM described his role in these words:

I have the responsibility for bringing together the entire Police station, all the units, groups within the station, to implement initiatives and action plans to reduce all volume crime—burglary, theft ex cars, and unlawful takings—and to reduce vehicle collisions.

4.2.1   Barriers to the Crime Strategy Manager position

The main barrier to the CSM position was that as the position evolved responsibilities were added to it, which diminished the focus on strategies to reduce crime.

The CSM had relatively few people reporting to him, but there was an understanding within the station that he had the authority to initiate strategies and request cooperation from all sections. Respect for both the original and the new incumbent of the CSM position meant that cooperation from other sections was forthcoming.

4.2.2   Strengths of the Crime Strategy Manager position

Strengths of the CSM position which emerged from interviews were:

- the CSM promoted crime reduction as a common goal among all sections of staff

- the Area Controller supported the CSM by making it clear that the CSM had the authority to call staff from other units to implement operations or initiatives

- as the acknowledged leader of the Area's crime reduction effort, the CSM obtained strong cooperation from other staff

- both people appointed to the CSM position were experienced and respected officers.

4.3   Q-car and burglary attendance

Since 2000, efforts had been made to improve the initial attendance and investigation of burglary. Most dwelling burglaries were reported after the event, occurring while householders were away from home, so burglary attendance did not involve emergency response. The Area standard was to ensure households which had reported burglary were visited within 24 hours. During 2000, a constable position named Q-car was dedicated to the initial investigation of non-urgent burglaries within the Area. This officer worked weekday hours and followed up burglary reports received by the Police Communications Centre (Comms). Any urgent reports during the day, night or weekend were initially attended by the Incident Car (I-car) on duty. In Wainuiomata, I-cars attended all burglaries. The Q-car officer also followed up any witness reports or other leads, but if an offender was identified, the GDB staff would locate and apprehend them.

Following the first quarter of 2002, the Q-car was not operating to full strength in Lower Hutt, and there were periods when it did not operate at all, owing to sickness and the pressure of high priority crimes. However, the practices followed by the Q-car were also to some extent observed by the GDB staff who covered burglary attendance in their place.

In 2003, the system was operating well, with one officer dedicated to Q-car duty. Several of those interviewed in mid-2003 described the value of a consistent first contact with burglary victims, and said that the quality of the burglary reports submitted by the Q-car officer gave a sound basis for burglary investigation. By the end of 2003, when the staffing situation in Lower Hutt had improved, a three-person Q-car squad was instituted and covered early, day and late shifts.

In 2004, the Q-car was once again affected by policing priorities which required staff to be reassigned to other duties. For much of the year there was once again a single Q-car officer who dealt with as many burglaries as he could, with the rest being attended by GDB staff.

Investigation practices had changed slightly in that the Q-car officer was spending more time conducting enquiries in the street where a burglary had occurred in an attempt to gather information that might identify an offender. The Q-car officer participated, along with Scene of Crime Officers (SOCO), Tactics and the CSM, in the new weekly meeting designed to pool information gathered during burglary investigations.

4.3.1   Rationale for Q-car and burglary attendance

The rationale for Q-car attendance was that high-quality information gathered soon after a burglary would increase the chances of an offender being identified and the burglary resolved. A comprehensive 'Burglary Offence Report' (POL 23) was used to record the initial information required. Police interviewed stated that the introduction of this report with its checklist approach had improved and standardised the recording of information on burglaries, leading to improved input and electronic retrieval of burglary information.

The Q-car officer also provided an 'Attendance Pack' to burglary victims. This was designed both to support the victim and to reduce the chances of a further burglary. The Q-car officer explained each of the items in the pack and gave some brief security advice. (For more information about the contents of the pack, see Section 6.2, Security advice.)

Applying a thorough and consistent process to the initial burglary investigation, such as starting early in the morning so that victims were interviewed before they left for work, meant that victims were responded to more quickly, which allayed some of their anxiety and ensured that more recent information was obtained.

4.3.2   Barriers to the effectiveness of Q-car attendance

Two barriers to the effectiveness of Q-car attendance were identified through the evaluation. The first was that other policing priorities took precedence over staffing Q-car positions over and above a single officer. The volume of burglaries was such that a single officer could only get to a proportion of them during a shift and the rest had to be attended by GDB staff. This severely reduced the benefits of a consistent approach to burglary investigation.

The second barrier was that, at times, the Q-car officer(s) worked somewhat in isolation and were not fully integrated into the burglary reduction effort. Steps were taken in 2004 to ensure that full advantage was taken of information gathered by the Q-car officer in the course of his investigations.

4.3.3   Strengths of Q-car attendance

This approach to the initial investigation of burglary was seen as having several advantages. These were that:

- it ensured a consistency of approach across Lower Hutt, which increased victim satisfaction and ensured the quality of information gathered

- by attending most burglary scenes, the Q-car officer could link burglaries with a similar modus operandi (MO), leading to a greater likelihood of resolution

- improved information collection led to easier input and retrieval of electronic data for analysis of trends and links between burglaries

- it led to more effective and appropriate use of SOCO resources

- the appointment of an officer with good communication skills had benefits for victims and for the quality of information obtained

- it freed GDB staff for emergency response and other work.

4.4   Tactics (Intel)

The Lower Hutt Intel group—named 'Tactics'—consisted of a manager and four to five staff. This group was a hub for the Area's burglary reduction strategies and a key provider and receiver of information. Lower Hutt had a well-developed Intel system for several years, owing to the insight of an earlier manager, and had become a model for other Areas. It had also been the first to use some software applications, such as MAPS.

Tactics was committed to the maintenance of a full and complete database for burglaries in Lower Hutt. This included entering full offence reports for all burglaries, theft ex cars and unlawful takings. For burglary, information on property, MO and notings of targeted persons and suspicious activity was entered in detail. This enabled later retrieval, and links could be made between offence reports and suspicious activity. It also enabled crime mapping, which could establish patterns of location, time and MO for burglary.

Tactics undertook a wide range of work. During the evaluation period some of their key tasks included:

- using MAPS—producing maps which identified where burglaries had occurred in order that appropriate policing strategies could be developed

- working with bail—compiling a list of local offenders on bail, with photo, name, address, bail conditions, and next court date for each duty shift to conduct checks

- entering notings—entry of handwritten notings which came from all sections; notings might include names, and addresses of people of interest as well as details of places and times when they were seen, associates, vehicles, etc.

- profiling—Tactics compiled profiles of targeted recidivist offenders and displayed these in the muster room with photos and details of vehicles, associates, etc.

- dissemination of information—Tactics provided information to all sections at meetings, on bulletin boards, through maps, and by other means.

  - In 2002 this was predominantly done at shift fall-in.

  - In 2003 the key communication meeting was the weekly Crime Meeting.

  - In 2004 Tactics was preparing the information on which daily taskings were based.

- monitoring policing activity—Tactics recorded a range of information on Police activity, which was used for monitoring performance

- analysis of burglary-related Intel—burglary files and notings were analysed and passed on to the CSM for action by TRG, CIB or GDB sections if any suspect was identified, a fingerprint match was made, or an avenue of enquiry emerged.

At District level, the primary role of the District Intel's Strategic Analysis Group was to produce fortnightly reports monitoring progress against District targets, two of which related to burglaries and clearances of burglaries. The strategic analyst also occasionally completed special projects, such as a profile of convicted burglars in the District. All Intel units of the District met monthly to exchange ideas and share information, particularly about the movement of convicted offenders between Areas. Prison staff was present at these meetings to brief Intel units on inmates soon to be released to Areas in the District.

In 2003, Tactics was feeling the pressure of understaffing along with all other areas of the Lower Hutt Police. There was frustration that frontline staff had just come to really understand what Tactics could do for them, only to find that reduced staffing limited Tactics' ability to collect, enter, analyse and report Intel in ways that were really useful. Data entry continued to be a big issue, even with a three-month secondment of an extra full-time data entry person. The links between Lower Hutt Tactics and District Intel were still not well developed. While both groups were performing similar functions, few mechanisms existed for information exchange between them.

In 2004, Tactics was still not fully staffed and continued to feel under pressure to produce the strategic analysis sought by other sections. The Area Controller recognised that Tactics had become the default option for a range of work that was not strictly related to Intel collection and analysis. In 2004, he endeavoured to change this pattern of behaviour to allow Tactics to concentrate on crime analysis.

Tactics was central to the introduction of Hutt Crim (see Section 4.8). The Tactics burglary analyst—who estimated 60–70% of his time was spent on burglary—produced a daily report on all burglaries that had been reported to Comms in the previous 24 hours, and made this information available to the daily tasking meeting. Previously, details of recent burglaries would only be available to inform policing decisions once the data had been entered into National Intelligence Application (NIA), which could take several days. Tactics also produced a weekly problem profile, essentially a summary of the past week's crime—where, when, why, how, who—'hot' locations, 'hot' commodities, and 'hot' offenders. The weekly problem profile was designed to provide an overview of the information being fed through to the daily tasking meetings. The intent was that when Hutt Crim became fully established, Tactics would be central to longer-term crime forecasting.

4.4.1 Rationale for Tactics

Analysis of Police Intel plays a crucial role in the current approach to policing. The emphasis now is on how crime can be reduced and prevented as much as it is on catching offenders after the crime has occurred. Information needs to be timely, complete, relevant, accurate and effectively analysed if Police are to use it as a basis for operational decisions and the most effective application of finite resources.

Many of the Police interviewed spoke with enthusiasm of their work being 'Tactics driven' and in line with a national emphasis on 'Intel-led policing'. Tactics was seen as a very useful resource, with the potential to be even more useful if the unit could undertake more analysis of crime trends in a way that might allow crime to be anticipated.

4.4.2   Barriers to the effectiveness of Tactics

The following barriers to the work of Tactics were identified in interviews:

- *data issues*

  – data quality—an absence of national standards governing the quality of information recorded and then entered into NIA led to a lack of consistency between Areas and Districts in how information was recorded and entered, and hampered reliable comparison of Lower Hutt's performance with that of other Areas

  – NIA—the lack of consistency between Areas and Districts in the use of the NIA led to a lack of confidence in the information contained in the database, which resulted in Areas developing their own recording systems; NIA was described by some staff as slow and not user-friendly

  – IT systems—Police use a range of IT systems, and at times the same information was entered in different fields in different IT systems

  – data entry—while investigating officers generally typed in their own offence reports, much of the information, such as notings and bail reports, needed to be entered from handwritten sheets, which placed a heavy demand on sometimes inadequate data entry resources

- *inadequate resourcing*—staff absences and inadequate data entry staff led to Tactics constantly feeling on the verge of being overwhelmed by the quantity of incoming information, and lacking the capacity to undertake strategic analysis

- *insufficient skills in strategic analysis*—strategic analysis required specialised analytical skills not always available within the unit, nor was training in strategic analysis readily available

- *youth offenders*—prior to 2002, data on youth offenders had been stored in paper files and not entered in the national database.

4.4.3   Strengths of Tactics

Several strengths of Tactics were identified through interviews.

- *Support from Wellington District*—Priority was given to Intel within the District. Several Police interviewed commented that Wellington District resourced Intel well and provided forums and time for networking among Intel staff.

- *The use of Intel for performance monitoring*—Intel resources were used to monitor Police performance on initiatives at the local level, such as bail checks and directed patrolling, as well as to monitor Area and District performance against Police targets. Staff who had

worked in other Districts commented that this was a strength of the burglary reduction effort in Lower Hutt.

- *The central role played by Tactics in the Area policing*—Lower Hutt was seen as an Area in which the Intel function provided clear direction and coordination to the policing work and to crime reduction strategies. The data was being used to give focus to the work, and Area support was visible in the extra resources to assist with data entry given to Tactics whenever possible.

- *Willingness to try new strategies and tools*—Tactics had taken up opportunities such as the MAPS software, and was constantly trying new approaches to obtain the best use from it. The work of the Lower Hutt Tactics group with the mapping software was seen as a model for good practice within the District.

4.4.4   Suggested improvements to Tactics

Almost all Police interviewed for the evaluation, including those within Tactics, believed that the unit should move on to more proactive crime analysis. While the output of Tactics—reporting retrospectively on offences and offenders—was useful, an ability to analyse crime trends more closely and identify patterns in a way that would allow Police to anticipate crime was what was really needed. A GDB sergeant said this:

> *Where it's all well and good to know where things have happened, tell me who's doing it and where they are going to strike next. I know that's crystal ball gazing, but that's the whole point of analysis. That's the whole point of intelligence to map out the next step…to be there before it happens.*

There was widespread agreement that to undertake this strategic analysis effectively required both more resourcing and more training for Tactics.

At District level, it was thought that the Intel function would be improved by a stronger national directive in several areas. There was a need to achieve national consistency in the types and quality of data entered into national systems. There was also a need to develop a national standard for the hardware and software, for example that used for the mapping function, used in Intel work. District Intel staff also thought that continuing improvement could be achieved through formal evaluation of the effectiveness of the initiatives in place. A review of District Intel was completed in 2004.

4.5   Police Central Communications Centre

Comms was the interface between the public and frontline staff in Lower Hutt. The overall aim of Comms was to ensure incidents were attended in as timely a manner as possible. The role Comms played in the burglary strategy was in the timeliness of responding to reports from the public of burglars on premises, reports of suspicious activity, and reports of historical burglaries, and the quality of initial information taken.

Comms covered the lower North Island including south of Taupo, Gisborne, and New Plymouth. Comms fielded all 111 calls and calls to local Police stations which involved a current incident. Day-to-day administration calls were received locally.

Comms operated 24 hours a day and was at all times managed by a shift manager, who essentially had the command control of any incident until it was assumed by staff in the local area. The call-taker logged the initial call, established the address and location and assessed the priority of the call. For burglary, the call-taker established where and when (if this was known) the burglary happened, mode of entry, what was taken, any damage done, mode of exit, and when Police could attend. Details were typed into the CARD database.

If the call was a 'burglars on', meaning the burglar was still on the property or in the vicinity, it was given priority one, which was rare for burglary. A priority one call required immediate response, and the call-taker sent data to the dispatcher for that Area while keeping the caller on the line. The call-taker did not conduct the investigation over the phone, but they gathered enough information to equip the patrol unit to respond to the incident. Dispatchers were required to dispatch priority one calls within two minutes of the incident being entered.

One or two dispatchers were allocated to each Police Area. The dispatcher received information via CARD and allocated incidents to units. Most calls were not priority one but historical burglaries. These were entered on a prioritised list, dispatched within one hour, and attended within 24 hours by the Q-car, or an I-Car if the Q-car was not operating.

If fingerprinting or further evidence needed to be collected from the scene, the job was logged for SOCO to work through. A burglary call remained 'active' until the crime scene had been visited. The dispatcher also made referrals to Victim Support for all burglaries, assaults, robberies, and domestic incidents.

The dispatcher monitored the location of each unit within the area. Each unit logged on and off with the dispatcher via the radiotelephone and informed the dispatcher of their location.

4.5.1   Rationale for the Communications Centre

The public is seen as a key source of information about crime. As the first point of contact, Comms was important in encouraging the public to report suspicious activity. Staff members interviewed were clear that they were happy to receive false alarms, as one timely call could result in an apprehension and resolve multiple offences. Comms staff made a point of giving feedback on the outcome to people who did ring in.

For priority one incidents, the timeliness of communication between the Centre and GDB staff was crucial, as timely attendance made it more likely that offenders would be apprehended. A number of the Lower Hutt staff interviewed expressed some frustration at the delay in receiving reports of priority one calls, to the point where they believed burglars who might have been caught on the job were evading capture. In some cases, they said, 15 to 40 minutes could have elapsed before they reached an address in which a burglar had been reported on the premises. A further problem identified was that callers were not being kept on the line for priority one incidents so that updated information could be fed through to frontline staff as the situation changed.

4.5.2   Barriers to the effectiveness of the Communications Centre

Two main barriers to the effectiveness of the Communications Centre were identified: staffing constraints and inappropriate performance measures.

4.5.2.1   Staffing constraints

A difficulty in finding experienced managers for the Centre was seen as a manifestation of the loss of experienced staff in New Zealand Police over the last few years. The Centre had been through periods of high staff turnover and had explored ways to reduce staff stress levels. Some Lower Hutt Police staff perceived that the use of non-sworn staff (who receive six weeks training) meant there was a lack of knowledge of policing among those employed at the Centre. This impacted on the quality of information gathered, and on decisions made under pressure.

In 2003, the Comms Manager reported that the Centre was attracting more sworn staff both as applicants for permanent jobs and through an exchange programme designed to ensure that Comms and GDB staff were familiar with both working environments and systems. In his view, this development was helping to reduce some of the tension between GDB staff and Comms.

4.5.2.2   Performance measures

Some Lower Hutt Police believed that the measurement of performance based on average call time led to calls being rushed. This resulted in poor quality information and a tendency to terminate calls where the informant could provide valuable information updates for Police on the ground.

4.5.3   Strengths of the Communications Centre

Comms staff believed the adoption of the priority categorisation system and the development of standard guidelines for dealing with each level of priority had improved the performance of Comms since the beginning of 2001. They also thought that a new rostering system allowing for overlap between shifts and training time had improved performance. While staff worked primarily with the same Police Area, the roster allowed one period every ten weeks in which they gained experience working with another Area.

4.6   Burglary clearances

Police have National, District, and Area targets for the clearance of reported burglaries. A clearance involves identifying the offender responsible for a particular offence, but does not necessarily mean that the offender is prosecuted or convicted of that offence. Convictions for burglary and clearances together translate into a resolution rate. The Lower Hutt Area in the year 2001–2002 achieved an 11.6% resolution rate for reported burglaries (including both residential and commercial). In the 2002–2003 year, the District and Area target for resolution of burglary was 18% (see Figures 10.9 and 10.10).

Several methods were employed throughout the evaluation period to raise the number of burglary clearances. Police interviewed believed the most effective method was to apprehend burglars 'on the job', which required cooperation from the public in reporting suspicious activity, and a timely response to such reports. Such apprehensions were rare, however, and the majority of burglars were apprehended through forensic evidence, such as fingerprint matches, or through being found with stolen property.

Another way of resolving burglaries was through custody clearances. When an offender was apprehended, all files and maps of reported burglaries with similar features, such as location and MO, were analysed to try to identify other offences that individual might have been involved in. Police then interviewed the offender to establish whether there was a connection. Staff acknowledged that this was a specialised kind of interviewing and some officers were considered to have particular skill in custody clearance. At the end of 2002, the Area purchased a digital camera so that the SOCO team could photograph burgled premises. These photographs were then available to be used during interviews with apprehended offenders. Offenders already in custody were at times offered immunity from prosecution for other offences to which they confessed.

In 2003, the CSM reported that custody clearances were down compared with the previous year despite the introduction of a new system in which the court section sent through copies of the committal warrants for everyone with a custodial sentence for burglary. These were forwarded to the Property Squad or TRG, who then went to the prison and followed up with offenders with a view to clearing offences. The CSM thought this initiative had been less than successful in improving clearance rates because of the lack of staff to implement it.

In 2004, the majority of custody clearances were being achieved through interviews by CIB. Custody clearances were once again being addressed more systematically, with everyone arrested for a burglary or volume crime being interviewed.

4.6.1 Strengths and weaknesses of burglary clearances

Police Areas have targets for resolution rates and this provides an incentive for putting resources towards clearance. However, not all Police interviewed were convinced that increasing burglary clearances had any effect on reducing burglary.

The practice of obtaining confessions which did not lead to prosecution, while increasing an Area's resolution rate, was thought to encourage offenders not to admit to their offending unless they were offered immunity from prosecution, and led burglars to believe that they would only be held accountable for a small proportion of their offending. Moreover, the practice prevented victims from experiencing satisfaction that an offender had been held accountable for a burglary.

Clearances without prosecution or conviction also meant that the courts received only partial information as to the extent of a convicted burglar's offending history, sometimes resulting in offenders receiving sentences out of proportion to their actual offending. It was frustrating for Police when evidence came to light which directly linked an offender to offences for which they had received immunity from prosecution.

4.7   Crime Focus

Following a visit to Rotorua in April 2003 by the OC Tactics, Lower Hutt adopted the Crime Focus week. This involved identifying a particular type of criminal activity to be the crime focus for a two-week period and requiring all officers, from constables to the Area Controller, to make some form of contribution to reducing that type of crime. The Crime Focus week or fortnight brought together in a coordinated way existing strategies such as targeting offenders, directed patrolling and identifying 'hot' spots.

In 2003, each Wednesday after the crime meeting, a brief Crime Focus meeting was held, attended by a representative of each of the policing groups within the Lower Hutt Area. The purpose of the meeting was to review what had been achieved with respect to the Crime Focus for the past seven days, plan for the next seven days, and if necessary adopt a new Crime Focus for the coming fortnight. The Crime Focus was selected by Tactics based on analysis of recent criminal activity. An expectation was created that alongside other work, and whenever an opportunity presented itself, officers would look for ways to address the current Crime Focus.

The Emergency Response section (also known as GDB) acknowledged that there were times when staff were not attending incidents, and some of this time could be put towards addressing the Crime Focus. The OC Emergency Response said this:

> *Having the focus is good, because we are not constantly 24 hours a day, seven days a week busy. We do have our down times. We do have days when not a lot happens, and the guys accumulate a hell of a lot of paperwork in the busy times and they need those times to pick up. It is those times that we utilise to do more curfew checks, try to prepare some of the arrest warrants that are sitting there piling up, and focus on these areas, depending what they want out of us, whether it be door knocks, or more specific checks. We will do them as we can.*

This is how the OC CIB described that team's approach when the Crime Focus was burglary:

> *My job is to make sure, based around our priorities and our ability to react to high priority crime, such as crimes of violence, in any given week or day, my staff are also firstly aware that we are currently all in this area focusing on burglary…and how are we going to achieve that focus? We are going to do it by ensuring that our crime car, which is a CIB patrol that goes out in the evening and the early hours of the morning, is aware who are the target offenders, that I want them to do foot patrols in certain areas of the city, I want them to get out of their vehicle, and speak to youth, etc.*

The weekly Crime Focus meeting created a strong mechanism for accountability, with each participant having to either report on his or her team's contribution to reducing the Crime Focus or justify why a contribution had not been made. The CSM said this:

> *They are accountable to the Area Controller, who accepts what they have done, or the reasons why they haven't done it, and it is signed off. If their performance is unacceptable it will be recorded as a performance issue on their personal appraisals.*

4.7.1 Rationale for the Crime Focus

All staff believed that the Crime Focus week or fortnight was an effective way to reduce the focus crime during that period. In the two-week period when the Crime Focus was burglary the number of burglaries was well down on previous figures. Similarly, truancy dropped when the Crime Focus was truants, and car racing reduced when 'boy racers' was the focus crime. Having a Crime Focus rather than an identified 'hot' spot reduced the likelihood of the criminal activity being displaced from one part of Lower Hutt to another. The CSM said this:

> *What we have noticed with our focus weeks is that with burglaries when we focus on areas as opposed to individual targets, the reduction is greater. So if we are just going into an area, we are just displacing the burglars into another area. But when we identify the burglars and our focus is on these six or 10 people, and we are visiting them, the figures seem to go down. So we are going away now from the areas 'hot' spots, although we still patrol those areas.*

Having a Crime Focus was also perceived as having a deterrent effect, and the Police were convinced that news of where they would be targeting their efforts quickly travelled through the community. This was supported by some community respondents interviewed who were aware of the Crime Focus strategy, and one reported the current Crime Focus—or 'crime blitz'—was a subject of discussion amongst local young people.

4.7.2 Barriers to implementing the Crime Focus

The chief disadvantage to the Crime Focus was that while the intention was that activities should be in addition to officers' regular work, when the Area was as understaffed as it was in 2003, staff constantly had to prioritise effort. Prioritising the Crime Focus sometimes meant that elements of officers' core jobs were given less attention than they otherwise would have been. CIB was seriously understaffed for significant periods of 2003, and while they were very committed to the Crime Focus, they felt the effects on their own work. The OC CIB said this:

> *This week for example, I have had a detective sergeant plus four or five staff totally focusing on the burglar and the youth criminal out there—by specifically going out and doing patrols, stopping vehicles driven by known burglars, doing foot patrols and speaking to known criminals in the street, going to their homes and speaking to them there. All of these quite specific tactics mean they are doing that at the expense of their own work. The files on their desks, a lot of criminal investigations to do, that they have to set to one side. So you as the victim of a rape, robbery, or whatever the crime of violence is, think we are getting on with it, but we are not today or this week, because we are focusing on burglaries.*

The success of the Crime Focus strategy relies on regularly giving staff a new crime to focus on. As the success of the strategy depends on asking people to do a little extra over and above their regular work, it will only succeed as long as the approach remains fresh. This means the strategy may be less effective in targeting crimes, such as burglary, which are ongoing. The OC Emergency Response said:

> *Burglaries are a huge priority for us. But you can't keep saying burglaries every week is a priority because people just get sick and tired of it and there is no challenge. So we have to change the priority to*

keep it fresh and people interested, and Police officers are no different to anyone else. They like to be challenged and excited so the onus is on Tactics and everyone else to come up with new strategies and new priorities every week. So we change it around and mix it up.

4.7.3   Strengths of the Crime Focus

All staff saw the Crime Focus strategy as having significant advantages. It was easy to implement, and, because it drew together traditional policing practices of observation and notings, directed patrolling, and targeting known offenders, staff took little convincing of its value. As it drew on current practice, no additional training was required.

Another perceived advantage of the Crime Focus was that it involved every single member of staff in the Lower Hutt Police Area. Staff believed it created a sense of ownership of the problem of crime in that, no matter what their job within the Police, individuals or teams could no longer regard reducing the focus crime as the responsibility of others. The Area Controller said:

We have said to those people who traditionally haven't seen themselves as being directly involved in the duty of crime, so haven't really contributed directly, we have said now everyone has to accept the responsibility of reducing crime and that gives us one focus.

The OC Emergency Response expressed a similar view.

What it has done, it has focused us. There are 141 staff in Lower Hutt and it has put the responsibility on every single one of those, saying that burglary is a priority for us and therefore it is a priority for you. When we talk about 141 staff, we are talking about Youth Aid Workers, community constables, Youth Education Officers, people that don't really associate themselves with burglaries, because it is not their core business, so therefore they feel they are not responsible or have an interest in it. So what we have tried to do is to include them in that kind of focus.

And this comment from an officer whose career has been in Traffic:

It is the ownership, you are given something to do and feel wanted. That is what it is all about. For years, Traffic staff was on the outer, out there dealing with the crashes, up to their necks in it all the time, but now we are a little bit more wanted, and have got to the stage now, that when people have worked in Traffic, they don't want to leave because they are getting the best of both worlds by being able to go out and do their own work and able to think for themselves, but also being involved in Crime Focus.

The Crime Focus remained in largely in place until the introduction of Hutt Crim model in mid-2004.

4.8   Crime and crash reduction intelligence model

In August 2004, Lower Hutt Police Area introduced the first stages of Hutt Crim. Based on an English model, Hutt Crim was designed to reduce and resolve all crime, not just burglary.

It introduced greater focus, urgency and accountability to policing priorities. The Hutt Crim model has three key elements.

- Police priorities are forecast three to four months ahead through quarterly strategic crime control meetings, which involve Police and community stakeholders. These meetings set priorities for Intel gathering, prevention activities and enforcement operations.

- Analysis of District and Area Intel data is used to identify patterns of offending in the priority areas determined through the forecasting process. The analysis is focused on trying to anticipate criminal activity, rather than on reporting activity that has already occurred.

- The officer with responsibility for Hutt Crim decides which activities will be immediate priority, and assigns responsibility for those activities to individuals or sections within Lower Hutt Police. These duties are allocated at daily 'tasking' meetings, along with the date on which progress will be reviewed.

Lower Hutt Police Area adopted the model after observing it in practice as 'ECrim' in the Eastern Police District. The Area Controller made it very clear that at the time of interview in 2004, Hutt Crim had not yet been fully implemented. It was in its early stages, and while the daily tasking meetings had been introduced, the forecasting process was not yet in place and guiding priorities for Hutt Crim as it would when the model was fully implemented.

Lower Hutt gave the CSM the main responsibility for Hutt Crim. He devised the strategies and prepared the daily taskings, and it was to him that individuals or sections were accountable for the actions with which they had been tasked. Every day at 9.00am there was a tasking meeting. Taskings frequently involved existing policing practices, the difference being that they were allocated to individuals, sections or the whole staff. Examples of taskings in the week interviews were undertaken included:

- (Suspect name) to be interviewed re any possible involvement in respect of the burglaries committed in the (location specified) area. (Task allocated to Youth Services)

- High visibility mobile patrols to be done during early shift and late shift at (locations listed). These locations are recent burglary 'hot' spots. (Allocated to all staff)

All the relevant OCs attended to hear about crime committed over the previous 24 hours. Burglaries were discussed at length, people responsible were discussed, and strategies and tasks were put in place to try to address those burglaries. At the tasking meetings individuals and sections were held accountable for tasks previously allocated. For example:

5.10.04   Focus for the month of October is dwelling burglaries. Document comprising top 20 offenders distributed to OCs for home visits.

15.10.04   54 home visits completed.

The minutes of the daily meeting were written up and posted on the bulletin board.

The Area deliberately removed some of the activities formerly undertaken by Tactics in order to free capacity for their role in Hutt Crim. The Area Controller said that he was aware that Tactics had previously been asked to do things that were not really within its brief, and changes were made to free capacity for Tactics to undertake the analysis that would allow Police to anticipate crime trends rather than respond to them. The crime meeting, held weekly until 2004, reduced to fortnightly, and this too reduced the workload of Tactics, which produced a wide range of information and reports for the crime meeting.

Hutt Crim brought to attention the need for all sections of the Lower Hutt Police to be available to contribute fully to the initiative, and was one of the drivers behind the restructuring of CPC and Youth Services staff outlined in Section 5.6, Youth services strategy.

4.8.1   Rationale for Crime and crash reduction intelligence model

Hutt Crim is designed to introduce greater urgency and accountability to combating crime. In some ways a further development of the Crime Focus, the key burglary reduction strategy in 2003, Hutt Crim retains a whole-of-station approach to crime reduction and takes it further by giving individuals and sections responsibility for specific tasks for which they then become accountable. The CSM described it in these words:

It is about being given a file and saying—you have ownership, we want urgency—if not, why not?

The rationale is that with increased ownership and accountability, effort will be more closely targeted at policing activities known to be effective.

4.8.2   Barriers to implementing the Crime and crash reduction intelligence model

In an attempt to 'get some runs on the board', the Area Controller acknowledged that the operational elements of Hutt Crim were introduced before the community consultation and forecasting framework was in place. With the model having been so recently introduced, it was not obvious what effect this would have on the effectiveness of Hutt Crim in operation.

One result of giving overt priority to the daily taskings was that, at times, other work would remain undone. While this was openly acknowledged, in the early stages of operation it was not yet clear what this would mean for the performance of Lower Hutt Police.

A few officers believed that holding the crime meeting fortnightly instead of weekly was a backward step because offenders of interest were no longer being profiled as regularly to the whole staff.

4.8.3   Strengths of the Crime and crash reduction intelligence model

Police interviewed for this evaluation identified leadership, urgency and accountability as the main strengths behind Hutt Crim. It was seen as 'giving teeth' to the Crime Focus, which was a major plank of burglary reduction in Lower Hutt in 2003. While the Crime Focus emphasised the contribution that every individual could make—no matter what their role in the Police—Hutt Crim took this a step further by making individuals accountable for specific actions identified by the CSM.

Another identified strength of Hutt Crim was the acknowledgment that, in requiring individuals or sections to give priority to activities with which they have been tasked, there may be other work that is not completed within that period. This is in contrast to the Crime Focus, which asked all officers to give extra attention to that week's crime focus on top of their other work. The Area Commander said this:

> *One of the advantages of this model is that during the course of the day, you have to make compromises with what you are doing and accept that you won't get everything done. By tasking, whether it be a burglar, following up a solvent abuse, or a DNA—we say that is what you must do, that is our priority and that is designed to reduce our main crime. If you have to drop off something else whatever it may be, that is fine. So the big shift in our focus is that we the management team set the priorities, not the individual.*

A further strength of the Hutt Crim model is that when the model is fully in place, identifying policing priorities will be done in conjunction with the community, and that creates an opportunity for Police to identify opportunities for community partners to assist in crime reduction. For example, theft from cars is a continuing problem, particularly from large outdoor carparks, which in Lower Hutt are the responsibility of the City Council. Hutt Crim will enable Police to work with the Council on issues such as carpark location and the use of signs to warn car owners of the danger of leaving valuables in their car.

5 Offender-focused initiatives and practices

Offender-focused initiatives and practices are those that aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by apprehending or curtailing the activities of those who commit burglary. Five offender-focused initiatives and practices of the Lower Hutt Police Area will be discussed below. They are:

- proactive weeks
- bail checks
- targeting offenders
- the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints
- scene of crime investigation.

5.1 Proactive weeks

Over the two years prior to the evaluation, Lower Hutt had instituted 'proactive weeks' among which were special operations relating to burglary.

In 2002, the CSM and TRG planned and instituted the weeks, which took place between five weeks and three months apart. The CSM compiled a temporary team of GDB staff, CIB staff, and other specialist staff such as the Iwi Liaison Officer, to work intensively for three days to one week on some aspect of burglary reduction. Each of the proactive weeks had a different focus, which included:

- executing search warrants
- visiting those recently released from prison
- visiting all second-hand dealers to review their licences and check that they were meeting legal requirements.

Proactive weeks gave junior staff the opportunity to work with the very experienced and highly regarded TRG, which was good for both morale and staff training. By the second half of 2002, Lower Hutt Area was finding it difficult to mount proactive weeks because of the non-availability of staff.

In 2003, proactive weeks were discontinued, primarily because of staff shortages. The Crime Focus, described in Section 4.7, retained some of the elements of proactive weeks.

5.2   Bail checks

The routine seeking and enforcing of bail conditions was an important part of the burglary reduction effort in Lower Hutt. Opposing bail and seeking remand in custody for offenders who met the criteria had also become more common since the introduction of the Bail Act 2000.

Bail conditions were primarily enforced through curfew checks. In 2002, Tactics prepared curfew sheets which were updated every two days with photo, name, address, bail conditions, date of next court appearance, and a column to record the time, date and result of the check. The names were rotated regularly to ensure all offenders with bail conditions appeared over time. Separate lists were prepared for late and night shifts and for northern, central and southern parts of the Area.

At fall-in, the sergeant briefed their section on the tasks, including curfew checks, for the shift.

Curfew checks were an important subject for performance measurement. Activity reports were prepared on the basis of the completed curfew sheets and were considered both at five-weekly training sessions with managers and at crime meetings for the performance of all staff in the Area. Managers interviewed were impressed by the ongoing commitment of staff to this practice.

During 2002, defence counsels were beginning to make submissions that requirements for an offender to present themselves at the door of their house during the night were impractical because of disruption to elderly, young, or sick household members. This resulted in an internal directive to officers in charge of cases to check and record details of the household set-up so the prosecutor could counter these types of submissions.

In 2003, the commitment to monitoring bail conditions, particularly curfew checks, as an effective means of reducing burglary remained strong, but the level of checking fluctuated, largely in response to staffing numbers. Applications for bail conditions made by Police were routinely supported by a report of the defendant's circumstances in an attempt to counter judicial reluctance to impose curfew checks that might affect family members.

In 2004, bail checks were being targeted at those individuals identified as of most interest to the Police, as part of the tightened focus on the most active offenders.

5.2.1   Rationale for bail checks

Bail checks are designed to prevent offenders from reoffending while on bail. Bail checks, when carried out randomly and more than once a night, are intended to contain the offender at home and thereby prevent criminal activity. When a person on bail was found to be absent from home and there were burglaries, this identified him as a suspect. While bail checks could be disruptive to families, Police believed that at times the disruption resulted in a family taking some responsibility for ensuring the person on bail observed the curfew.

While the overall effectiveness of bail checks was unquantifiable, Police believed the strategy had a downward effect on the number of burglaries by keeping offenders aware that the Police were monitoring them and their movements.

5.2.2   Barriers to bail checks

Police staff identified these barriers that, in their view, reduced the effectiveness of bail checks.

- Courts were at times reluctant to impose strict residential conditions.

- Defendants sometimes gave a false address to the court.

- Few daytime curfews were granted, making this policing mechanism ineffective for daytime burglars.

- Curfews imposed in FGCs for juveniles were not enforceable in the same way.

- Some Police were uncomfortable with frequent bail checks, and had the view that there was a fine line between frequent checks of bail conditions and harassment.

- Other Police work often took priority, meaning bail checks were not always done.

5.2.3   Strengths to bail checks

Virtually everyone interviewed for this report considered bail checks a deterrent to known offenders reoffending. Bail checks made it very clear that Police were monitoring offenders' activities, and that anyone in breach of bail conditions would be considered a suspect for crimes committed at that time.

Police thought that bail checks allowed them to get to know the offenders in an Area, their habits, their associates and their patterns of activity.

Bail checks can provide focus and direction to patrol staff. They encourage staff to stop and question known offenders wherever they are seen.

5.2.4   Improvements to the effectiveness of bail checks

The Lower Hutt Police planned to strengthen the effectiveness of bail conditions by seeking more non-association orders and daytime curfews. They also identified a need for better communication with the judiciary to explain what Police were trying to achieve by seeking bail conditions, and to try to find some agreement on how bail conditions could be best applied.

5.3   Targeting offenders

During the two years prior to 2002, the Lower Hutt Area had instituted a system of identifying and targeting recidivist offenders, particularly burglary offenders. The initiative

was driven by Tactics, which selected and profiled a range of recidivist offenders in different ways. The profiles included:

- photographs

- names and aliases

- addresses

- conviction histories

- associates

- vehicles

- other information, such as whether they own a gun.

These were displayed in the muster room and projected to all staff at the crime meeting. Throughout the evaluation period different groups of targets were identified, including:

- target of the fortnight—one recidivist offender, frequently a burglar, for all staff members to 'target' during the period

- the 'top 100'—a list and photos of recidivist offenders about whom Tactics was seeking information on movements, associates, vehicles

- the top 10, 12 or 20 repeat offenders whom Police strongly suspected might be actively offending when burglary statistics were high

- people released from prison—District Intel passed information to Areas on released inmates from prisons, particularly those identified as at high risk of reoffending.

Targeted offenders might or might not also be on bail. Targeting involved randomly visiting the selected people, stopping their cars, or stopping them on the street. These visits were conducted along the lines of friendly enquiries. GDB staff members were expected to carry this out where possible as a part of the work of their shift. CIB were more likely to target repeat offenders and their associates as a form of 'overt surveillance'. CPC staff also participated, and could pass on to less-experienced section staff their knowledge of local recidivists. All staff recorded visits to targets in the form of notings that were passed back to Tactics, which compiled weekly and monthly reports on the number of visits to each targeted person.

In August 2002, after monthly reports showed few visits were being completed, targeting was reorganised so that each GDB section selected their own targeted person for a five-week period. Each section was paired with a CIB team to share the target. Each section was asked to give Tactics a weekly verbal or written report about their targeting activity over the previous week. Again, this was monitored and reported back to all staff at the crime meeting. This arrangement was intended to give each section more ownership of the process; however, toward the end of 2002, there had been little improvement in the number of notings recorded.

Targeting was still operating in much the same fashion in 2003, although low staff numbers had reduced the amount of activity. The introduction of the Crime Focus also meant that rather than allocating each GDB section a target, offenders to be targeted were profiled at the weekly Crime Meeting with the expectation that all staff would consider them high priority in the week ahead.

In 2004, with the introduction of Hutt Crim, targeting the top 20 offenders continued to be a key policing tool. Through analysis of a range of formal and informal sources of information, Tactics produced a list of people thought to be of most interest to Police in relation to burglary. This list of individuals was given to the CSM, who developed, allocated and monitored strategies designed to establish whether links exist between the target and recent burglaries.

5.3.1 Rationale for targeting

Police believed this practice had the effect of curtailing offenders' activities or making them move out of the Area. The visits increased offenders' perception that if they offended the chances of being caught were high.

Experienced Police could quote instances where family members welcomed the visit, either because they did not know that their young person had been in trouble, or they were worried about their behaviour. In these situations, families could see the Police as allies in trying to get the young person to stop offending.

Targeting visits could also sometimes generate useful Intel relating to associates, movements, or property.

5.3.2 Strengths in targeting practices

Targeting offenders gave staff specific objectives in relation to monitoring recidivist burglars within the Area. Specific objectives were backed up with the measurement and assessment of staff performance on meeting those objectives at an Area, unit and individual level.

Officers received strong backing from management in the event that they encountered problems or complaints through carrying out target visits. The Area Controller assured staff that they would be supported in doing this work.

5.3.3 Barriers to targeting

The main barriers to implementing targeting were:

- a level of discomfort with the practice among Police
- fitting it in with other priorities
- perceived discrimination in targeting
- receiving information from other justice agencies about targets.

In addition, as the effectiveness of the practice could not be quantified, it was difficult to make a case to convince reluctant staff of the benefits.

5.3.3.1 Discomfort with targeting

While Police had a right to go on to any property to make enquiries, junior officers in particular were concerned that the practice did not have a legal mandate. They were more comfortable checking bars and doing curfew checks for which there was legal backing. Underlying this was a concern that the visits could be perceived as harassment.

5.3.3.2 Other priorities

When staff were busy responding to emergencies and fulfilling other requirements, there was little time to do this type of proactive work.

5.3.3.3 Perceived discrimination

A community worker from one of the most disadvantaged areas within Lower Hutt observed that this community felt singled out and bitter towards the Police as a result of targeting. She observed that white-collar criminals never seemed to be the target of this kind of policing.

5.3.3.4 Receiving information

Protocols with Probation concerning the transfer of information about convicted burglars released to the Lower Hutt Area had to be clarified in 2003. The Police considered it essential that they have this information if they were to proactively monitor the activity of known burglars.

5.3.4 Effects of targeting offenders

Some possible effects of the practice of targeting offenders were studied. First, the trends from 2000 to 2004 in the average annual burglary conviction rates of a sample of 41 offenders[2] targeted in the Lower Hutt Area in 2003 were examined.

Figure 5.1 shows that the average conviction rate for burglary was higher in the year of targeting (2003) and the year following targeting (2004) than in the years prior to targeting (2000–2002). Over the years 2000–2003, the total number of burglary convictions in the Lower Hutt District Court showed a declining trend, and a slight increase in 2004 (see Section 10). These patterns suggest that the Police targeting activity may have led to an increase in the likelihood of apprehension and conviction for the targeted offenders in the year of targeting.

Secondly, in order to assess whether there was a displacement effect from the Police practice of targeting offenders, the court locations of burglary convictions for offenders targeted in the Lower Hutt Police Area in 2003 were examined from 2000 to 2004.

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[2] All offenders selected for the sample were aged 17 or over in 2000, so their convictions could be obtained from the criminal history data in the Justice Data Warehouse.

Figure 5.1: **Average annual burglary conviction rates for offenders targeted in Lower Hutt Police Area during 2003 (N = 41)[1]**

1   The rate represents the average number of burglary charges for which convictions were obtained per offender per year.

Figure 5.2: **Court location of burglary convictions for offenders targeted in the Lower Hutt Police Area during 2003 (N = 41)[1]**

1   The location of the district court in which convictions were obtained has been used as a proxy for the location of the offences for which convictions were obtained.

Figure 5.2 shows that the sample of offenders targeted in 2003 had burglary convictions both in the Lower Hutt District Court and elsewhere in each of the years 2000–2004. Further examination of the data showed that convictions obtained elsewhere were primarily in the Wellington District Court in each year. This suggests that this group of offenders was highly mobile within the Wellington–Lower Hutt region. However, the high number of convictions

in Wellington in 2003 and 2004 suggests that there may have been some displacement effect from the targeting in Lower Hutt.

5.4   The collection of DNA samples and fingerprints

The matching of DNA samples and fingerprints is an important means of linking suspects to offences or eliminating suspects from enquiries. The effectiveness of these methods of resolving burglaries and other offences depends on the existence of large national databases of individual DNA samples (the DNA Databank) and fingerprints (Automated Fingerprint Identification System database or AFIS). These are used to seek matches with samples found at crime scenes.

5.4.1   Collecting DNA samples

In 2002, DNA samples could be obtained voluntarily from any adult suspect or apprehended person, and compulsorily only from those convicted of burglary. In October 2003 (effective 15 April 2004), the law was changed to allow:

- DNA samples to be taken from burglary suspects without their agreement (even after the law change DNA samples could not be taken from juveniles for the purposes of a prosecution, even with parental permission)

- DNA to be collected from buccal samples (mouth swabs) rather than only from a blood test

- DNA samples to be taken from convicted offenders without the signed approval of a district court judge—this saved considerable time and effort in those cases where the prosecutor had omitted to put the application before the judge at the time of conviction.

These changes had significant implications for the collection of DNA in that DNA became easier and less expensive to collect, and could be routinely collected from convicted offenders. Prior to the law changes, both collection and analysis of DNA samples was expensive and frequently procedurally complex.

Throughout the evaluation period each Police Area was given a budget and a quota of samples to be collected each year. Area performance in the collection of DNA was measured and assessed by means of a monthly DNA summary report and the importance of continuing to request voluntary samples was stressed at the crime meetings. Lower Hutt met its DNA collection targets in each year of the evaluation period, and at times the Area subsidised collection of DNA samples over the number for which the budget was provided. The changes to the law came towards the end of the evaluation period but Police were optimistic that the changes would speed up the collection of the DNA databank.

A CIB staff member was appointed to coordinate DNA sample collection in the Area. This person's role was to encourage staff to continue to collect samples, to produce monthly statistics of samples obtained, and to coordinate the complex processes for obtaining compulsory samples.

5.4.2 Collecting fingerprints

All apprehended adults were automatically fingerprinted. Fingerprints from juveniles could only be obtained voluntarily and with parental consent. It was estimated that the AFIS database contained fingerprints of only 7% of juveniles who had been apprehended. Youth Aid and other staff at CPCs in particular were involved with this initiative. They explained to young people they apprehended that having their fingerprints in the database could eliminate them as a suspect. To parents they emphasised the deterrent effect on further offending when young people knew Police had their fingerprints. Many parents also supported fingerprinting because it meant that if their young person continued to offend, they were less likely to get away with it. Photographs were also generally taken at the time fingerprints were obtained.

5.4.3 Rationale for collecting DNA samples and fingerprints

Matching suspects' fingerprints to those found at crime scenes was an important means of clearing burglary offences, as burglars were rarely caught in action. Gathering voluntary fingerprints from juveniles resulted in a number of matches with burglary scene evidence, and there was a view that apprehending young people early might interrupt a path to more serious offending later.

Throughout the evaluation period there were few clearances of burglary offences through the matching of DNA. The building of a DNA database was seen as a longer-term investment in future resolutions of a range of offence types, particularly violent and sex offences. Frequently, those apprehended for these types of offences had burglary convictions in their histories. DNA matching was also very useful for eliminating suspects and could save a great deal of time checking suspects using conventional methods.

Police believed that the collection of both DNA samples and fingerprints acted as a deterrent for some offenders.

5.4.4 Strengths to the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints

Having an officer with responsibility for ensuring DNA samples were collected and for managing the complex process around DNA collection (particularly prior to the 2003 law change) was seen as a strength to Lower Hutt's DNA collection. The DNA coordinator monitored charge sheets for DNA-relevant offences, and had developed several resources to assist staff in interpreting the legislation and making applications. He had also prepared packs for DNA applications with the forms required in the correct order. The courts had responded positively to applications when the correct paperwork and processes had been completed.

In 2004, the DNA coordinator introduced new systems to ensure that when a match was made between a DNA sample from a crime scene and the DNA database, it was followed through, even if the file was no longer being actively managed.

Lower Hutt Police staff members interviewed for this evaluation were very supportive of the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints, and actively sought samples from offenders and suspects.

5.4.5   Barriers to the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints

In 2002, Police identified cost and funding, the complexity of the process and the limitations on the offences for which DNA could be collected as barriers to the collection of DNA samples. Following the law change of 2003, the process was simplified, and the range of offences for which a sample could be compelled was widened, leaving the main barrier to greater collection of DNA the cost and the funding.

Police hold a limited budget for obtaining DNA samples. During the evaluation period it cost around $80 for a doctor and $35 for a registered nurse to take the sample, and Hamilton Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) charged $350 to profile each individual for the database. From time to time the fixed budget was overspent. However, Lower Hutt Area was supportive of the collection of samples in both 2003 and 2004, and when the target was exceeded extra funding was granted to cover costs.

5.5   Scene of crime investigation

Lower Hutt and Upper Hutt Police Areas shared a SOCO unit of three staff, which was based at the Naenae CPC throughout the evaluation period. SOCO:

- visited crime scenes which had been identified as potentially containing physical evidence

- examined the scene

- collected exhibits, samples, and fingerprints from the scene

- assessed the materials

- performed some tests

- sent materials to the national forensic laboratory if further tests were indicated.

In 2002, investigating officers made referrals to SOCO through Comms. SOCO monitored the system for referrals or Comms could make contact directly. The unit worked 7.00am to 6.00pm seven days a week, was available on call, and attended all burglary scenes within 24 hours. SOCO in the Hutt Valley had a policy of attending as many referrals as they could as soon as possible following a burglary. In 2003, the Q-car was attending the majority of burglaries in Lower Hutt and they would refer a scene to SOCO if the Q-car officer thought the scene might yield evidence.

SOCO mainly looked for fingerprints, because that was the quickest and easiest way of identifying the offender. Fingerprints were searched electronically on AFIS. When a match was found Tactics was informed, reactivated the file and allocated it to an investigating officer. SOCO would only become involved again if required to give evidence in court. When the electronic system was introduced, many matches were achieved and it was common

for SOCO to give evidence, and this tended to have a convincing effect on juries. However, time spent in court left the team short-staffed.

When DNA samples were found, SOCO referred to Tactics to determine whether they should be sent to ESR for profiling as the cost was significant. In 2002, only a small number of cases involved DNA, but there was widespread recognition that this would increase dramatically as the technology for collecting samples was refined.

For most of the evaluation period SOCO worked largely in isolation, reporting to OC Tactics. In 2004, Lower Hutt initiated a weekly meeting between the CSM, OC Tactics, SOCO and the Q-car officer(s) in order to maximise the contribution SOCO officers could make to burglary Intel.

5.5.1 Rationale for scene of crime investigation

The introduction of the AFIS system led to a large number of fingerprint matches and apprehensions for burglary. However, this had reduced over time, mainly as offenders learnt to wear gloves. The SOCO team believed that their effectiveness lay in attending a large number of burglary scenes, including those that appeared to be minor offences. This led to apprehensions of less experienced burglars or even professional burglars who occasionally left evidence. A SOCO officer said this:

…going to crime scenes, gathering what evidence there may be there quickly, efficiently, and getting on with the next job…It's like a raffle—the more tickets you buy the more you increase your chances. That job that you might not want to go to or you perhaps talk the [investigating officer] out of putting a job in for, that might be the one that's got the fingerprints, so you need to go to as much as you can.

5.5.2 Barriers to scene of crime investigation

The chief barriers to effective crime scene investigation were:

- times when crime scenes which could potentially yield evidence were either not referred or inappropriately referred to SOCO
- the expense involved in collecting, keeping and testing evidence
- the IT system for processing evidence
- public knowledge fuelled by television drama.

5.5.2.1 Referrals

During 2002, Lower Hutt had difficulty in resourcing a Q-car, which was an officer dedicated to burglary investigation (this function is described in Section 4.3). This meant that GDB staff carried out investigations and entered referrals into the system. When less experienced staff carried out investigations, inappropriate referrals could be made, either fruitlessly raising victims' expectations that evidence would be collected, or missing an opportunity for evidence to be collected.

In 2003, this had been overcome and a dedicated Q-car officer was in post. A single officer was attending almost all burglaries and collecting a consistent set of data from them. He was also able to assess how recent the burglary had been, and whether SOCO needed to prioritise attendance. The Q-car team briefly increased to three people during 2003–2004, which meant that burglaries could be attended more quickly, before staffing priorities again reduced the team to one officer.

5.5.2.2   Costs

The high cost of profiling DNA samples meant that scenes and samples selected for testing needed to be prioritised, and that potential evidence had to be discarded without being tested.

5.5.2.3   IT system

The SOCO team found the system for printing out the information for each referral cumbersome. It required printing a great deal of irrelevant information and was time-consuming.

5.5.2.4   Public knowledge

The SOCO team also observed that the public fascination with forensics meant that there was a great deal of public knowledge about Police methods that could be used by criminals to avoid leaving evidence. Programmes such as *Crime Watch* and educational programmes in schools, while improving the public profile of Police, could work against their ability to gather forensic evidence.

5.5.3   Strengths of crime scene investigation

The extent to which matches occur between offenders' and suspects' DNA and fingerprint samples and crime scene evidence is highly dependent on both the quantity and quality of crime scene evidence obtained. Having a small team with a consistent approach dedicated to the collection of crime scene evidence increased both the quantity and quality of evidence collected.

5.6   Youth Services Strategy

The YSS was designed to improve and coordinate the way Police dealt with young offenders and young people at high risk of offending in the future. It was implemented in Lower Hutt in 2003.

Implementing the YSS was the responsibility of the Youth and Community Services Coordinator. The YSS had three main elements to it:

- ensuring that work with young offenders and young people at risk of offending was based on a sound understanding of best practice

- aligning the work of those groups within Police that deal primarily with young people

- educating officers throughout the Police about how to work most effectively with young offenders.

Youth Aid, Youth Education Services and the J-teams are the groups that work largely with young people. Prior to the appointment of the Youth and Community Services Coordinator, the groups worked largely in isolation from one another and took somewhat different approaches to young people. Under the implementation of the YSS, however, there was recognition that while the roles of the three groups were different, the fundamental principles of how to work effectively with young people should be common and underpin the work of all the groups and other members of the Police.

Both Youth Services and GDB staff agreed that the law relating to the way Police can deal with young people had not always been well understood or applied most effectively by officers in Lower Hutt. Through the work of the Youth and Community Services Coordinator there developed a better understanding of how the law could be applied to young people, and in particular that young people can be arrested if the circumstances require it, without that arrest necessarily leading to them being charged with an offence. The YSS placed a strong emphasis on treating young people well, and processing them formally if required. Whenever the staffing situation allowed for it, frontline officers had the support of a rostered youth worker, either a Youth Aid officer or a J-team member, available for them for advice or to call out should they need assistance when dealing with a young person.

In 2003, a Youth Aid officer was on duty every morning to follow up any young people who had been arrested overnight for burglary or other offences. This practice was designed to ensure young people did not go straight from being arrested to court and then on bail back to the environment from which they offended. All staff acknowledged that the implementation of the YSS was in its early stages in 2003, but there was considerable optimism that it would be effective in reducing burglaries and other crimes committed by young people.

In 2004, structural changes which affected the Youth Services staff were absorbing much time and energy. The changes were achieved, and at the end of 2004 Youth Services staff were to be housed together in one building. As with other units and services, Youth Services were allocated, and held accountable, for tasks under the introduction of Hutt Crim.

5.6.1   Rationale for the Youth Services Strategy

The YSS was designed to get young people who were actively offending to take their criminal behaviour more seriously. There was a perception that prior to the appointment of the Youth and Community Services Coordinator, some Police had at times been turning a blind eye to young people offending in the belief that the law did not allow them to deal with young offenders effectively. As the Strategy bedded in, that view became much less widespread and Police more confident to use the powers the law provides.

In addition, the Area Controller held the view that if young offenders were processed properly, there was the potential for improving Police Intel on crimes committed by other young people. He explained it like this:

You see if we catch a 21-year-old burglar, he stays in the cells, is interviewed by CIB, and we deal with him. If you catch a kid, half of the time they don't get into the cells, because the staff thinks we can't arrest him, what is the point? What we are trying to say is no, let's arrest him, treat him like an adult offender, interview him. In fact logic suggests today that they are more likely to tell us about criminal activity even if they are not offending themselves. Youth have a very good network about who is doing what.

The YSS gave section staff more confidence to deal with young offenders, and promoted the view that dealing with youth offending is a Police responsibility, not just a Youth Aid responsibility. This increased ownership of youth offending, and the need for better information exchange with Youth Aid, highlighted the need for all staff to make effective use of the NIA so that knowledge about young offenders and their activities could be shared.

The principles underpinning the YSS are that effort should be targeted towards those young people at greatest risk of offending or reoffending, and that the factors which contribute to their offending, and which can be influenced, should be addressed. In this respect the YSS encompasses prevention as well as promoting proactive and effective ways of dealing with young people who are currently offending.

5.6.2   Barriers to the effectiveness of the Youth Services Strategy

Barriers to the effectiveness of the YSS included:

- the views of some officers about the place of prevention work within policing
- inadequate data on youth offending
- organisational and structural barriers to the cohesion of staff working with young people
- resistance to change by some Youth Services staff
- understaffing within the Police Area.

5.6.2.1   Attitudes

Despite widespread enthusiasm for the potential of the YSS, some frontline officers believed that in an under-resourced environment, prevention work should take second place to the core business of policing.

5.6.2.2   Data

Up until 2003 there was a lack of reliable data about the volume and nature of offences committed by young people in Lower Hutt. In 2004, for the first time, District Commanders were to be measured on whether they had reduced youth crime, and the need to keep separate youth crime statistics was welcomed by senior officers. In 2003, the CSM said this.

No one has ever measured youth crime. I have had a look at our stats, and I know that our youth crime stats from 2001–2002 have gone up by 13%. Now that is a figure that no one ever cared about before because we went down 1% overall. So that is saying our youth crime is climbing. If you look at

the stats from 2002–2003, they are climbing again. That has always been hidden in the overall stats and because we have been coming down, no one has cared.

The lack of good data about youth offending was also a frustration to the Youth and Community Services Coordinator, who was keen to see frontline Police making informed decisions about how to deal with young people based on sound data about offending patterns. He noted, however, that it is difficult to track youth crime statistics, as until a young offender has been linked with a burglary, there is no way of knowing that burglary was committed by a young person. In contrast to other crime, Police have to rely on clearance rates to give an indication of the proportion of dwelling burglaries committed by young people.

5.6.2.3   Organisational structure

The organisational structure of the Lower Hutt Police Area in 2003 in some ways operated as a barrier to the implementation of the YSS. The Youth Aid staff was attached to CPCs and under the control of the OC of each CPC, as were Youth Education Services staff. The J-teams, although also attached to specific communities, came under the control of the Youth and Community Coordinator. Implementing the YSS, with its new and unified approach to young people, was not easy when CPCs at times had other priorities. While the Youth and Community Services Coordinator was responsible for developing and leading the YSS, he was not the line manager of the staff who had to implement it. In 2004 this was addressed, and all Youth Services staff were brought together in one building, under the leadership of the Youth and Community Services Coordinator.

5.6.2.4   Resistance to change

The YSS required Youth Aid staff to operate differently from before. Under the new approach, Youth Aid staff increasingly spent their time out and about talking to young people at the times they are at most risk of committing burglary and other offences. This work, often at night, was in contrast to their previous roles of liaising with the Department of Child, Youth and Family (CYF), attending FGCs and linking with schools and other agencies, work more often undertaken in the daytime.

5.6.2.5   Understaffing

One of the frustrations expressed by Youth Services staff was that with the understaffing situation that prevailed for much of 2003, Youth Aid officers in particular were often required to fill gaps in the Emergency Response sections or were diverted to other duties. This hampered progress when the Area was trying to give a priority to addressing youth crime.

5.6.3   Strengths of the Youth Services Strategy

A key strength of the YSS was seen to lie in the commitment, skills and abilities of the Youth and Community Services Coordinator driving the Strategy. Widely respected for both his understanding of the realities of policing and his determination to reduce the offending of young people, the Coordinator appeared, in 2003, to be winning 'the battle of hearts and minds' that he described as being an essential part of his job.

The YSS was given strong support by the Area Controller, most visibly through the establishment of the position of the Youth and Community Services Coordinator, a position which reported directly to him.

The YSS empowered Police, some of whom had previously felt disempowered when dealing with young people. Police felt much clearer about both the purpose and the process when dealing with young people.

The YSS is based on the principles of addressing young offenders' 'needs'—which lead to their offending—on one hand, and their 'deeds'—the crimes they commit—on the other. These principles underpin an approach to youth justice that is wider than the Police, and are also embodied in the workings of the Youth Court. The Youth and Community Services Coordinator sees a major strength of the YSS as being the alignment between the sector and the approach the Police are taking.

5.6.4   Suggested improvements to the Youth Services Strategy

The intention, in 2003, was to introduce a 'duty week' for Youth Aid and J-team staff. The duty week concept was modelled on the CIB duty week, when they have staff assigned to support the crime car. A youth-focused duty week would involve staff rostered to take immediate action if a youth comes to notice or is missing. The duty week did not get off the ground in 2003, largely because Youth Aid staff was frequently assigned to other duties, and also because it was taking some staff a while to fully embrace the new approach.

In 2004, the Youth and Community Services Coordinator still intended to introduce a more proactive arm to Youth Services, as well as a team dedicated to Youth Justice processes such as FGCs, once the restructuring had taken effect.

6 Victim-focused initiatives

Victim-focused initiatives are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by encouraging residents to increase the security of their households, neighbourhoods and communities. Three victim-focused initiatives of the Lower Hutt Police Area will be discussed below. They are Neighbourhood Support, the provision of security advice, and Victim Support.

6.1 Neighbourhood Support

A key partnership for Lower Hutt Area was that with the Neighbourhood Support liaison officer. This person was housed within the Police station building and had been recruited by the Area Controller, who had advertised for volunteers to carry out the role during 2000.

By 2002, the liaison officer had built up the network of Neighbourhood Support groups to 450 within Lower Hutt. They were advertised through:

- weekly articles in the community newspaper
- information to burglary victims
- suggestions from local Police
- word of mouth
- the liaison officer speaking at local community organisations.

There was usually an inaugural meeting where the liaison officer explained the purpose and functions of Neighbourhood Support and the community constable talked about security. Groups were encouraged to meet socially at least twice a year rather than holding formal meetings. The group coordinator held a list of contact details for group members.

When the liaison officer received information from Police about a recent burglary, she emailed the local coordinator with information about the general location (not the exact address), types of property taken and approximate date and time. The coordinator passed this on to the group via a telephone tree, email or mailbox drop and encouraged members who noticed any suspicious activity to ring Police directly. It was stressed that the coordinator was in no way a substitute for a Police officer and that members should ring a neighbour if they wanted to discuss something unusual before ringing Police. The Coordinator said:

> We're not telling people to take the role of a Police officer. We're not asking them to put their own lives at risk. What we are encouraging them to do is just become aware, keep an eye on their neighbour's property.

The liaison officer supervised a group of volunteers who were ACC or WINZ clients. These volunteers carried out mailbox drops of 'burglary notification pamphlets' in localities where burglaries had occurred.

Throughout the evaluation, the liaison officer was in regular contact with Tactics in order to gather and disseminate information as soon as possible after a burglary. She also attended the weekly crime meeting and gave a weekly report to the staff. She was careful to check any information she was passing to the community with Police officers beforehand.

In 2003, the Neighbourhood Support liaison officer had an e-watch network in place linking her by email to all the Neighbourhood Support groups. She sent out emails most days alerting different groups to suspicious or criminal activity in their area, in addition to putting flyers in letterboxes whenever she had the volunteer workforce to help with this. The liaison officer was also working with the Hutt News, the local community newspaper, to produce a weekly column designed to increase community awareness of burglary and burglary prevention activities. In 2004, she had access to the daily tasking sheet, which she found very useful as it constantly updated the information she could provide to Neighbourhood Support groups.

For two years the liaison officer role was a voluntary position. However, in 2002 a successful application was made to a city council community fund for a grant to pay a part-time wage. Resourcing such as computers and pamphlets was obtained through sponsorship, such as pub charities. In 2003, Neighbourhood Support was facing a funding crisis as the City Council grant was not going to be continued, and the liaison officer no longer felt able to continue in the role in a voluntary capacity. In 2004, Hutt City Council once again granted sufficient funding for a part-time wage for the liaison officer. As the incumbent needed full-time work, the Lower Hutt Police offered her a part-time job entering data for Tactics. This was a creative solution, as the job within the Police enabled the liaison officer to improve the quality of information she circulated to Neighbourhood Support groups.

At District level, Lower Hutt was seen as a model for Neighbourhood Support.

Household Survey (2002, 2004)

When asked whether they were aware of any Police or community activities that aim to reduce burglary in their neighbourhood, Neighbourhood Support was mentioned by 49% of the 500 respondents in the 2002 survey, and by 40% in the 2004 survey.

Sixteen percent of respondents were members of Neighbourhood Support in 2002, with 86% of members finding it helpful. In 2004, membership in Neighbourhood Support had dropped slightly to 13%, which was consistent with the other case study areas, all of which saw a drop in Neighbourhood Support membership.

The most common reason for finding Neighbourhood Support helpful was the general feeling of strengthening communities/getting to know neighbours. Those who weren't members of Neighbourhood Support generally hadn't been approached to join or sought to join, rather than having a definite reason against joining.

In 2002 a significantly greater proportion of those in Lower Hutt than other Areas had informal networks with neighbours. In 2004 this had been matched by an increase in informal support networks in other areas.

6.1.1   The rationale for Neighbourhood Support

The rationale for Neighbourhood Support is that the prevention and reduction of crime is not solely the responsibility of Police—the community has a part to play.

All of the local Police interviewed were aware of the Neighbourhood Support activities. They believed it was an effective means of raising awareness of crime in the community, and that it encouraged people to feel they had some responsibility to prevent and report crime.

Neighbourhood Support is based on the beliefs that:

- by receiving information about recent burglary in the neighbourhood, community members become more vigilant and more security-conscious and this could prevent further burglary in the neighbourhood

- by notifying residents soon after a burglary had occurred, Police might receive information leading to an arrest

- if the public is encouraged to observe and record any suspicious activity they are more likely to report it to Police

- bringing neighbours together will encourage a sense of pride in and ownership of the local neighbourhood

- it will create a sense of working in partnership with the Police.

However, some officers considered Neighbourhood Support more effective in raising awareness than in reducing dwelling burglaries. This view was shared by a security alarm installation company interviewed for this report.

6.1.2 Barriers to Neighbourhood Support

Three main barriers to the work of Neighbourhood Support were identified through interviews:

- a lack of resourcing for the scheme

- a perceived lack of priority given to the initiative by central government

- a lack of capacity within the Police to respond to information from the community.

6.1.2.1   Lack of funding

The funding that had been obtained from local government sources was short-term and only granted year-to-year through the evaluation period. The strength of Neighbourhood Support in Lower Hutt was closely related to the commitment put in by the liaison officer, who was only ever funded for some of the hours she put into the work.

6.1.2.2   Lack of support from central government

Although Neighbourhood Support operates in communities throughout New Zealand, there is little tangible support for the organisation. The provision of all resources, including computer equipment and software, is reliant on donations or sponsorship.

6.1.2.3   Lack of Police capacity

On some occasions when comprehensive and detailed information about criminal activity was received from the community, the Police lacked the capacity to respond. This was seen as a serious disincentive for the public to provide information.

6.1.3 Strengths of Neighbourhood Support

All of those interviewed referred to the exceptional skills and dedication of the Neighbourhood Support liaison officer. Strengths respondents identified were:

- a sound understanding of the philosophy underpinning the scheme, evident through the words 'neighbourhood support' rather than 'neighbourhood watch' in the name

- regular communication with groups, community organisations and the media

- the careful selection of 'the right people for the job' for any voluntary work

- effective recruiting and training of volunteers

- effective and appropriate communication with Police

- good administrative and communication systems

- 'lateral thinking' in terms of introducing new ideas for involving the community in taking responsibility for safety.

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6.2   Security advice

Provision of security advice was seen as another way of encouraging the community to take responsibility for their safety. This had been provided in Lower Hutt in several ways.

Investigating officers used a specially designed Burglary Attendance Pack when first attending the scene of a burglary. This pack was partly funded through the sponsorship of local businesses. Besides the comprehensive Burglary Offence Report, the pack contained:

- 'Home Security Hints'—a one-page list

- an invisible marker pen and 'Guidelines to use of marker pens'

- a flyer for Neighbourhood Support

- 'Victim Information', a letter signed by the attending officer

- a 'Stolen Property List' to record property discovered missing later

- a pamphlet for Victim Support

- sticker with 'Burglary Hot Desk' number

- a locksmith voucher

- the 'Complaint Acknowledgement Form' with the Police file number.

Just prior to the evaluation period, Neighbourhood Support, in partnership with a local community worker, distributed Burglary Attendance Packs to every household in the community of Pomare. Local second-hand shops were also given ultraviolet lamps with which to detect invisible pen markings on goods brought into them.

Victim Support contacted every burglary victim referred to them by Comms. Victim Support provided a booklet, *Reducing the risk of burglary,* to burglary victims with whom they had contact. This contained information on topics such as protecting your property, personal safety, knowing your neighbours, and being away from home, and included a security checklist and security number record.

6.2.1   Rationale for security advice

Several Police interviewed believed recording serial numbers was a useful way to increase the chances of a burglar being apprehended. Because this information could easily be stored and retrieved electronically, it was easy to check property that had been recovered on search warrants, or when second-hand dealers made enquiries.

Police also generally believed that visible alarm systems were an effective deterrent to burglars. While the results of the more formal assessment of the Pomare initiative were not yet available, the community worker was aware that some families had installed alarms and purchased insurance following the campaign.

Household Survey (2002, 2004)—security measures

All Lower Hutt respondents used one or more household security measures, the most commonly mentioned being simple precautions such as closing and locking windows and doors. For four of the specialised security measures (alarms, security chain on doors, windows with keys and surveillance by a security firm), Lower Hutt households had a significantly higher level of use than the average of the other areas. Specifically (in 2002):

- 94% of households always locked doors when no one was home
- 85% always closed or locked windows when no one was home
- 72% told neighbours when everyone was away
- 63% had doors with double locks or deadlocks
- 63% left lights, radio or TV on when going out
- 56% had outside lights on a sensor switch or security lighting
- 52% had a burglar alarm on the premises
- 51% relied on street lighting
- 45% had security chains on doors
- 43% had a safety latch to prevent a window opening fully
- 42% left outside lights on
- 36% had security markings on their property
- 29% noted down serial numbers of electronic property.

Results were much the same in 2004. The only significant change was that in 2004 the proportion who relied on street lighting had risen from 51% to 61%.

Almost all respondents (89% in 2002, 90% in 2004) thought security measures made houses either a lot or a little safer. In 2002, 59% thought it would be easy for a burglar to get into their own home, but in 2004 this had increased significantly to 63%. Of the respondents who thought it would be easy to get into their home, the most common reasons mentioned for not doing more to protect their home from possible burglary were not knowing what more could be done, not being able to afford it, not being that concerned or thinking it wouldn't work. Eighty-four percent of respondents had burglary insurance.

6.2.3   Suggested improvements to security advice

It was suggested that Police could revive the role of Crime Prevention Sergeant within the Area. This person would have the role of providing crime prevention advice and promoting practices such as recording serial numbers. On the other hand, some thought it more effective to ensure that every Police officer attending a burglary regarded it as their role to give advice on security.

It was thought that insurance companies and retailers could, at a national level, be encouraged to play more of a part in ensuring serial numbers of electronic goods were recorded. Some ideas for doing this were:

- having posters in retail outlets

- having advertising campaigns

- insurance companies requiring the recording of serial numbers of insured items.

6.3   Victim Support Service

Victim Support is nationwide, 24-hour personalised support for all victims of crime and trauma. Victim Support workers are available to:

- listen to victims

- offer appropriate options

- provide information about forthcoming processes

- assist victims to identify their own support networks for continuing support.

Victim Support services are based within the Lower Hutt Police Station and throughout the evaluation period Victim Support was available to victims of burglary as well as other crimes. Victim Support worked in close partnership with Police in supporting victims of burglary. Their aim was to empower victims to move forward and start rebuilding their lives following a victimisation. As well as providing counselling to victims of burglary, the Victim Support volunteers distributed burglary kits containing advice to victims to reduce the risk of further burglaries.

The effectiveness of communication between Police and Victim Support fluctuated throughout the evaluation period. Victim Support put considerable efforts into developing protocols, including a Memorandum of Understanding with Comms for how and when Police would determine that Victim Support was required, and contact them when they were needed. However, Victim Support expressed some frustration that protocols did not always work as intended.

7 Location-focused practices

Location-focused initiatives are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by identifying and applying Police resources to 'hot' spots where burglary is known to be prevalent. Directed patrolling is a location-focused initiative in the Lower Hutt Police Area.

7.1 Directed patrolling

Throughout the evaluation period, directed patrolling relied on Tactics-produced maps detailing the location of recent burglaries, theft from cars, and unlawful takings. Burglaries were identified as residential or commercial, and time of day, property stolen, and MO were also recorded. The maps indicated where crime had occurred and were used in different ways throughout the evaluation period.

Initially, they formed part of a Directed Patrolling Report (DPR) that was provided to section staff at fall-in for each shift and was faxed to the CPC. By the second half of 2002, Tactics was tailoring the maps for each shift, so that early, late and night shifts received a report of burglaries, theft ex cars, and unlawful takings which had occurred during the hours of their shift during the previous week, by locality. In 2003, directed patrolling in cars, and in some localities on foot, was still in place, and Tactics was still producing maps for the weekly crime meeting. With low staff numbers and the new Crime Focus week in place in 2003, the emphasis shifted slightly away from specifying policing strategies and towards addressing the week's crime focus in whatever ways were most appropriate, which included directed patrolling. In 2004, the continuation of the Crime Focus and the subsequent introduction of Hutt Crim continued the move away from blanket application of policing techniques like directed patrolling, to addressing crime using whatever strategies and resources were available and appropriate.

Directed patrolling relied on the involvement of traffic section. In 2002, the traffic section was well integrated into the directed patrolling work of the area. They received the DPRs and used these to position checkpoints and road patrols. Traffic section also fed back information about vehicles and people of interest to Tactics. Any traffic infringement tickets made out for people or vehicles known to Police were copied and given to Tactics.

In 2003 and 2004, national directives on traffic policing priorities combined with staff shortages in Lower Hutt Police meant that traffic section was at times less available to assist the burglary reduction effort through directed patrolling. A senior traffic sergeant in 2003 said:

> *We are trying to march to two drummers. We have an Area Manager for the Metro Area Traffic, a new broom that has come in at the moment. He is coming in with all these new and brilliant ideas, but again, he comes through being a technically trained person, hasn't had to do the job it is very difficult,*

thus my frustrations…Our problems with burglaries this week are Avalon, Kelson, Belmont area (up in the hills) where there are not that many vehicles around to be able to stop for checking seatbelts. So if my guys are going to achieve on our seatbelt campaign for the week, that is a bit of a problem. It is very difficult to do that and the other thing as well.

7.1.1   Rationale for directed patrolling

The local Police identified a number of benefits of directed patrolling. They considered that directed patrolling:

- increased the chances of an offender being stopped when driving to or from a burglary
- improved the visibility of Police and thereby deterred burglary activity
- provided an opportunity to gather Intel on the movements of known offenders
- increased the chances of cars being stopped with stolen gear still on board
- patrolled localities where burglaries are occurring and where burglars live
- uncovered and impounded vehicles from disqualified drivers, thereby depriving some burglars of their vehicles
- saved staff time by focusing activity on localities that might yield results
- increased Police visibility and reassured the public.

7.1.2   Barriers to directed patrolling

Some barriers to directed patrolling identified in interviews included that:

- traffic policing priorities reduced time available for directed patrolling
- other priority incidents, such as domestic incidents or road crashes, might dominate a shift, allowing no time for directed patrolling
- directed patrolling is labour intensive and was impossible when shifts were short-staffed
- the impact of directed patrolling is hard to quantify and therefore to 'sell' to staff
- more sophisticated offenders carried scanners to warn them of the whereabouts of Police.

7.1.3   Strengths of directed patrolling

The strengths of directed patrolling in the Lower Hutt Area were that:

- it integrated traffic staff and their resources towards the Area burglary reduction strategy
- the activity was measured and included in the performance assessment of individual staff and section units
- the availability and use of the MAPS software enabled a close focus on localities where crime had been committed.

8 Property-focused initiatives

Property-focused initiatives are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by reducing the market for burgled goods. Liaison with second-hand dealers and the Property Squad are two property-focused initiatives in the Lower Hutt Police Area which will be discussed below.

8.1 Liaison with second-hand dealers

Lower Hutt Police, particularly the CIB, TRG and community constables, all saw liaison with second-hand dealers as making an important contribution to burglary reduction. One community constable said:

> *I know that the majority of burglars won't commit the crime if they can't readily dispose of the goods and the easiest way really is through the second-hand dealers for quick cash.*

TRG had a specific role in second-hand dealer liaison, and regularly visited the local dealers, including scrap metal merchants. A member of TRG said:

> *We're very active in finding out who's selling stuff and we're always visiting them, seeing how they're going, saying gidday, you know, so they have no problem with ringing us. Basically those owners and managers are now on side with us and they are actively catching the burglars too.*

Until the law change in 2004 (effective April 2005), dealers had to work within the Secondhand Dealers Act 1963, which required them to:

- be licensed
- maintain a register of the source of all items bought
- hold certain items for one month before on-selling.

The Lower Hutt Police Area instituted a proactive week during 2002 in which a team was brought together from all sections to visit second-hand dealers and check that they were licensed, that they knew the requirements of the Act and that they were adhering to them. The exercise uncovered dealers who were ignorant of the law and at least one dealer who was actively breaking the law. An ongoing benefit was that TRG obtained a register of dealers in Lower Hutt which could be maintained and updated.

TRG established a rapport with a number of dealers who would ring and check serial numbers and property descriptions before buying electronic and smaller items. While it was rare to obtain a match, the process of ringing to check sometimes resulted in customers

abandoning the goods and leaving. Where goods were identified as stolen, or the seller was behaving suspiciously, some dealers stalled the customer until a TRG officer arrived.

In 2003, liaison with second-hand dealers had developed further with the implementation of Operation Crackle, an initiative which proactively supplied second-hand dealers with an information pack including:

- copies of the amended legislation governing their activities

- lists of stolen property

- serial numbers of stolen goods

- signs for display on their premises.

Interviews with second-hand dealers conducted in 2004 indicated that they had a good relationship with the Police and were confident about contacting Police if they were suspicious about the origin of goods offered to them. They appreciated the direct line to TRG and the speed of the response they received.

8.1.1 Rationale for liaison with second-hand dealers

Police and second-hand dealers interviewed identified these benefits from liaison work:

- dealers were able to check out suspicious goods or sellers and identify some stolen goods before buying, thus avoiding buying goods that might be confiscated later

- offenders were deterred from selling to dealers who were careful about what they bought and who they bought from

- stolen property could be identified and recovered

- some burglars were apprehended through stolen property being identified, and this occasionally led to the clearance of other burglaries or revealed a crime network

- Police could check registers to find out who had been selling property.

8.1.2 Barriers to liaison with second-hand dealers

Some barriers to maximising the effectiveness of liaison with second-hand dealers were that:

- few burglary victims provided serial numbers for their stolen property so there was rarely a match with serial numbers of property being sold to dealers

- the extent of liaison with dealers was not consistent across all Police Areas, so local burglars were likely to take their property to dealers out of Lower Hutt

- dealers could face a loss of trade or threat of retaliation if it was known they were cooperating with Police.

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8.1.3   Strengths of liaising with second-hand dealers

Local dealers said the friendly and approachable manner of TRG officers encouraged them to work with Police. For one, this was in contrast to an earlier experience when a search warrant was executed in the shop, leaving him very stressed and thinking that his livelihood was threatened.

The speed of response from Police when dealers rang to check property or customers was seen as a strength. This was partly due to their accessibility by telephone, and partly due to the fact that data relating to stolen property was recorded in some detail for speedy retrieval within the NIA database.

8.2   Property Squad

The Property Squad was a section of the CIB and was a reactive unit whose function was to oversee the investigation of property files which had positive leads. These files included burglary, damage and arson offences. They might be cases:

- with a tangible suspect where a search warrant was required

- where a fingerprint or DNA match had been made

- where the items stolen were of high value or represented serious risk, such as firearms.

TRG also dealt with these types of files and might take cases over if they were able to take action more quickly. Once an arrest was made, the Property Squad initiated the prosecution process and dealt with the court case of any cases they had investigated.

In 2002, each squad in the CIB spent one week in four on 'duty shift', which meant that they were responsible for attending and investigating any serious crime during that week. The work on these cases flowed into the remaining three weeks, so that investigating serious crime in reality became the core business of the squad. Of necessity, burglary and other property cases took a lower priority. This meant that property files which did not have an identified suspect rarely received active attention from Property Squad.

In 2003, CIB was understaffed for much of the year to the extent that Property Squad was hardly operating.

In 2004, a Property Squad of a sergeant and four officers was once again operating, along with four other CIB squads. Each squad took a duty one week in turn when it was responsible for any serious crime that occurred during the week. For Property Squad, in the weeks that were not duty weeks, as well as doing follow-up work on serious crime that had occurred during the duty week, they investigated property crime. Typically, they did this by:

- analysing Intel for trends and patterns in burglary
- identifying suspects and putting together operations

- conducting surveillance

- running clean-up operations by executing arrest warrants on offenders who had failed to appear in court, or search warrants to locate stolen property

- taking action where DNA or fingerprint hits had identified an offender.

8.2.1   Barriers to the effectiveness of Property Squad

Identified barriers to the effective operation of Property Squad related largely to resourcing, and to the volume of serious crime in Lower Hutt, which accounted for the resources of CIB.

9 Justice and community sector responses to burglary

9.1 Justice sector responses

Other justice sector responses to burglary documented in this report include:

- those within the Department of Corrections' Community Probation Service
- those within CYF
- the perspectives of legal counsel and youth advocates in Lower Hutt.

District Court Judges declined to participate in this research.

9.1.1 Community Probation Service

The Community Probation Service in Lower Hutt managed convicted burglary offenders at several different stages and in different ways. These included the preparation of pre-sentence reports, parole reports, home detention reports, managing community-based sentences such as community work, supervision, and home detention, and within these, referral to programmes.

The Integrated Offender Management process was based on extensive assessment of the level of risk and the criminogenic needs of individual offenders, regardless of the type of offence for which they had been convicted. Assessment revealed that burglary offenders were not homogeneous, and individual offenders might have very different criminogenic needs leading to a range of sentence recommendations.

Depending on the assessment of criminogenic need, the main programmes offered higher risk offenders in Lower Hutt were programmes which addressed criminogenic factors and 'Straight Thinking'. Programmes which addressed crimogenic factors looked in depth at offending patterns and examined belief systems, instituted relearning and put in place safety plans relating to reoffending. 'Straight Thinking' was a cognitive programme aimed at changing thinking and behaviour around offending.

9.1.2 Child Youth and Family

Burglary was not among the more common crimes committed by the young people who reached the attention of the Youth Justice Coordinators at CYF. When interviewed in 2003, they reported that young people they worked with were more likely to have committed theft or theft from cars. However, they acknowledged that this might change with amendments to

the Crimes Act, which broaden the definition of burglary to include crimes previously defined as theft.

Youth Justice Coordinators work with young people, their families and victims to address criminal behaviour, and their focus is on trying to prevent young people from further criminal behaviour and contact with the justice system.

Youth Aid Officers are the major interface between Youth Justice Coordinators and the Police, and their interactions are usually based around the behaviour of individuals and Family Group Conferences (FGCs). The Coordinators said they have a common understanding with Youth Aid Officers about the effective use of the Children Young Persons and their Families Act, but they believed that other Police sometimes got frustrated with the Act because they saw it as cumbersome, and not able to provide them with options for immediate action.

9.1.3   Lawyers and youth advocates

Lawyers interviewed in 2003 discussed the impact that the changes to the Crimes Act would have on youth crime statistics, particularly with the widened definition of burglary. One potential effect of the change was that the court has heavier sentences available to it for burglary than for theft. Young people, who tend to commit crimes previously defined as theft but now defined as burglary, may receive heavier sentences. Another implication of the change is that the Police can apply to collect DNA evidence from someone charged with burglary, whereas that was not an option when the same crime was defined as theft.

A youth advocate said that the Police practice of seeking a curfew for 'almost 100%' of burglary charges can create enormous difficulty for young defendants. This is particularly so in a situation where a defendant wants to defend a charge, but the justice system is not able to hear the matter for many months. The prospect of being on a 7.00pm to 7.00am curfew for an indefinite period is so unacceptable to some young people that they will plead guilty to avoid it.

In 2003, lawyers said that generally the criminal bar had a good relationship with Police in Lower Hutt, although this could be jeopardised when Police resource constraints do not allow them to meet their commitments and matters are delayed. The work of Youth Aid Officers and the J-teams towards reducing offending rather than seeking a conviction were commended by counsel. One lawyer expressed concern that the emphasis on statistics is beginning to drive Police practice, and that this was not always in the interests of reducing crime.

9.1.4   Relationships with other justice sector departments

Direct contact with other justice sector departments such as Courts, Corrections, or the CYF tended to be on a case-by-case basis. However, the Police interviewed were aware that the work of other agencies in the sector had a large bearing on the effectiveness of the burglary reduction strategies. They generally perceived that not all justice sector agencies were working to the same set of priorities.

There was a perception that the courts in particular did not share the view of government and the Police that burglary was a serious offence. The presumption against sentences of imprisonment for property convictions in the former Criminal Justice Act had led to a view among Police that the courts treated property crime as minor offending. While the penalties within the legislation were seen as sufficient, the courts tended to hand down penalties at the minimum end for burglary. Police were inclined to see themselves as the only agency that fully understood the impact of burglary on the victim.

In 2003, several officers expressed frustration with the increase in home detention being granted to convicted burglars. During the week interviews were held, a burglar wearing a home detention anklet had been caught while committing a burglary.

The relationship with Corrections was mostly in communicating with prisons. Lower Hutt Police believed an important part of their strategy involved receiving information from prisons about the release of inmates with histories of burglary. The introduction of the Privacy Act and a greater awareness of the issues of privacy and confidentiality had meant that there was less willingness to share information about individuals being released from prison.

Communication with Community Corrections or CYF tended to be over individual cases. Police readily recognised that each organisation worked to different objectives. While Police could recognise a need for rehabilitation of many of the offenders they encountered, they held that it was not their role to get involved in this.

9.2   Community responses to burglary

Police leaders at Area and District level were convinced of the need for Police to develop strong community partnerships in order for their strategies to be effective. At Area level, the key partnerships in relation to burglary reduction were with Neighbourhood Support, Victim Support, the schools, and the City Council. At District level, the business excellence model led to working closely with key community partners. The District Commander had established a Wellington Leaders' Forum, including the region's mayors and managers from key local and central government departments. This group in turn had established a set of priorities for crime prevention and reduction. Relationships with the community will be described further in relation to specific burglary reduction initiatives.

9.2.1   Safer Community Action Network

The most significant community crime prevention initiative in the Lower Hutt Area from 2002 to 2004 was the Safer Community Action Network (SCAN). Until 2004 SCAN was funded primarily from the Crime Prevention Unit of the Ministry of Justice and sponsored by the Hutt City Council.

SCAN employed a full-time project manager who sat within the Community Development Team at the Hutt City Council. Its governing committee included representatives from the Refugee and Migrant Service, CYF, WINZ, Housing New Zealand, the Disabled Persons' Assembly and Nga Awa, the Maori and Pacific Safer Community Council.

In 2002, SCAN had initiated or been involved in a number of crime prevention activities including a safety audit of the central business district, initiatives targeting groups of youth at risk, and support for the Pomare Project—a community strengthening project in one of the poorest areas of Lower Hutt.

In 2003, SCAN worked with the Lower Hutt Police to introduce CCTV monitoring of areas of the CBD. The safety audit of the CBD had been extended into the residential areas of Naenae and Taita. New SCAN initiatives included a combined Police and Council focus on compliance with the Liquor Licensing Act, including limiting the hours during which supermarkets could sell alcohol, and facilitating the Council and Police working together to implement the new laws allowing confiscation of the cars of boy racers.

In 2004, as a result of a government review some changes were made to SCANs around the country. In Lower Hutt the decision was made to redirect the funding which had paid for the coordinator's position to Hutt City Council. With the funding the Council created the position of Safe City Officer. The Safe City Officer continued to liaise with Police on community safety issues, and considered that formalising the position within Council brought a number of advantages, including:

- more ready access to a range of networks and forums, and to central government

- better resourcing as the Council added money to that provided by the Crime Prevention Unit

- a more obvious commitment by Council to shared responsibility for crime prevention.

9.2.2   Wellington Leaders' Forum

During 2002, the Wellington Safer Community Council was superseded by a Wellington Leaders' Forum. This fostered a joint approach to reducing crime between local city councils and agencies such as WINZ, ACC, and CYF. The Wellington District Police Commander met regularly with local mayors and regional managers of the key agencies. The Leaders' Forum had identified three specific areas of focus:

- domestic violence

- substance (particularly alcohol) abuse

- road traffic issues.

The approach was to identify those most at risk in each of these areas and bring to bear the joint resources of key agencies in health, education, housing, etc. in working with them. The Wellington District Commander also worked with the support of iwi and Pacific Islands' external advisory groups.

The Leaders' Forum was active in 2002 and 2003 in developing a partnership with local iwi social services. The partnership was designed to identify serious recidivist prison inmates who were being released into the District and refer them to local iwi organisations who would

work intensively in rehabilitating them into the community. This was seen as having strong potential for crime reduction.

The Leaders' Forum continued in 2004 and the District Commander reported that it was leading some very encouraging initiatives in the areas of CCTV and environmental design.

9.2.3   Bus company partnership

In 2001 the Lower Hutt Police Area formed a partnership with the local Cityline bus company and developed Operation Spot the Target. The aim of the operation was to provide Police with information that would increase their ability to create a safe community and a safe environment for drivers and passengers. Driver participation was voluntary. Drivers who elected to take part were informed by newsletter about burglary 'hot' spots and given the registration numbers of stolen vehicles. They kept watch as they moved around the city for missing vehicles or any suspicious activity that might require Police investigation. Drivers could communicate with Police through their own control room or directly through radiotelephone after hours. With over 80 buses on the road during weekdays in 2003 this generated a range of information for follow-up by Police.

9.3   Other crime prevention initiatives

The Police interviewed in 2002 and 2003 described a range of general crime prevention initiatives which were intended to have a downward effect on all crime, including burglaries. These initiatives, most of which involved partnerships with community organisations or government agencies, can be seen as part of the context in which specific burglary reduction initiatives were operating.

9.3.1   Family safety

During 2002 the Lower Hutt Area had begun to identify and work with families at risk of domestic violence. One officer had been allocated to the role of carrying out follow-up visits to families who had received multiple call-outs and to those incidents where there was a reluctant complainant. He had formed relationships with law firms to fast-track protection orders and with Women's Refuge, and had put together a domestic violence pack providing information for victims of domestic violence. This, combined with the 'youth at risk' strategies described in Section 5.6 of this report, was intended to target troubled families and stop the cycle of offending. By mid-2002 this position could not be sustained because of staff requirements in other areas.

9.3.2   District Team Policing Unit

Wellington District resourced a Team Policing Unit of a sergeant and seven officers, which was made available for special operations in the Lower Hutt Area every few weeks. An example of their work involved an operation in Wainuiomata in September 2002 in which the team focused on young people congregating in the local mall who were believed to have been committing offences. During term time, this team would use the truancy provisions to return

young people to school. They also gathered Intel through notings and gained voluntary fingerprints from young people who came to their notice.

9.3.3   District Compulsory Breath Testing Team

From July 2002, Wellington District was allocated resources for a new Compulsory Breath Testing (CBT) Team, which enabled CBT to operate within the District consistently throughout the year. The Wellington District Commander believed there were two mechanisms within this operation that might indirectly affect burglary. One was the link between crime and alcohol, so that if overconsumption of alcohol became more difficult and was more openly discouraged, this might have an impact on attitudes to alcohol consumption and alcohol consumption as a trigger for crime. The other link was the deterrent aspect of highly visible CBT operation to potential burglars who used vehicles as a tool in committing offences.

10   Crime data

10.1 Introduction

Crime data analysis is a component of the three-year evaluation examining the effectiveness of Police practice in relation to dwelling burglary. This is intended to supplement other information sources within each case study Police Area, such as interviews with key respondents, household surveys, victim interviews and offender interviews.

The main focus of the crime data analysis is to examine the incidence and resolution of dwelling burglary to assist the evaluation's assessment of the effectiveness of the dwelling burglary initiatives. Dwelling burglary, however, is not a crime that occurs in isolation. Dwelling burglary offenders are also often convicted for non-dwelling burglaries and other dishonesty or property crimes. The report therefore also examines other offences to provide a general crime profile for the Police Area and establish whether dwelling burglary initiatives may have resulted in a reduction or increase in other crimes in the Area (crime type diffusion or displacement, respectively)[3]. The recorded rates of crime in the Police Area are compared to those for New Zealand overall to establish whether any trends or changes within the Police Area were more likely due to Area initiatives or national trends.

This section begins with an examination of the composition of crime, followed by an examination of recorded crime for:

- total crime
- offence categories (the seven main categories of crime)
- dishonesty offences
- burglary
- dwelling burglary.

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[3]   The crime data analysis was to include an examination of dwelling burglary locations within each Police Area to assess whether location-focused dwelling burglary initiatives may have resulted in a reduction or increase in dwelling burglary in other locations within the Police Area (spatial diffusion or displacement, respectively). The New Zealand Police map-based policing system (MAPS) can produce maps indicating the locations of recorded crime data, reading this data from either the CARD system or the NIA system. Particular scene types (e.g, dwelling) from crime data in CARD currently, however, cannot be indicated by MAPS, whereas scene type with NIA crime data can. Unfortunately, while the Manurewa, Rotorua, Lower Hutt and Sydenham Police Areas entered large proportions of their recorded dwelling burglaries for 2002 into NIA, only small proportions of these had a geographical coordinate assigned to their NIA record. The MAPS system, however, requires the geographical coordinates in order to map the crime incidents to their locations. Furthermore, although MAPS graphically indicates the location of incidents within suburb and even mesh block boundaries, it cannot currently extract the dataset grouped by either suburb or mesh block. Therefore, it was not possible to do this analysis.

The analysis of recorded dwelling burglary offences includes a five-year historical review and an examination of monthly trends from 2000 to 2004.

Offence clearances involve the identification of the alleged offender/s responsible for a particular offence, but do not necessarily mean they are prosecuted or convicted of that offence (for example, they may be warned, cautioned, or referred to Police Youth Aid). Following the examination of recorded crime is an examination of the recorded clearances for:

- total crime
- offence categories (the seven main categories of crime)
- dishonesty offences
- burglary
- dwelling burglary.

This section concludes by examining trends in prosecutions, convictions and sentences for burglary, both nationally and within the court district which is closest to the Police Area. The data for this section was obtained from the Case Monitoring System through the Justice Data Warehouse.

10.1.1   Data from New Zealand Police used in this report

Official Police recorded crime statistics and clearances data in this report was obtained from the justice sector Law Enforcement System via the Incoff Offence Calendar Detail universe of the New Zealand Police Business Objects database.

Official Police recorded crime statistics record the scene type of the location where the offence occurred, enabling the examination of official Police recorded dwelling burglary data. As the non-dwelling scene types include the 'not applicable', 'null scene', 'unknown' and 'other scene' codes, an undercount of dwelling burglaries is possible. For New Zealand overall, the 'not applicable', 'null scene' and 'other' scene codes accounted for 7.3%, 8.2%, and 6.9% of all burglaries in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively.

Population data was used to calculate the rates of recorded crime in this report. Statistics New Zealand calculated the estimated resident populations for each Police station, based on the Police station boundaries as at the 2001 census. New Zealand Police then derived the estimated resident populations for each Police Area by summing data from the stations within each Police Area. The population data are the estimated population figures as at 30 June (mid-point) each year.[4]

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[4]   The estimated resident population for a given area as at 30 June is based on the 1996 census usually resident population counts for the years 1996–2000 and the 2001 census usually resident population counts for the years 2001–2004, updated for:
  - residents missed or counted more than once by the census (net census undercount)
  - residents temporarily overseas on census night
  - births, deaths and net migration between census night and the date of estimate
  - reconciliation with demographic estimates for ages 0–9 years.
  Visitors from outside the given area are excluded.

10.1.2 Interpreting Police recorded crime data used in this report

The crime data presented in this report is Police recorded data and not actual crime data. An incident that was reported to Police, or became known to Police by detection, and where Police believe an offence occurred is counted as a recorded offence. Changes in Police recorded crime can therefore be due not only to changes in the actual incidence of crime, but also changes in:

- the proportion of offences reported to Police
- Police recording practices
- Police practices in identifying unreported crime.

While the New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001[5] identified household burglary as one of the highest reported crimes to Police, an estimated 32% of New Zealand's household burglaries in 2000 were not reported. Similarly, the surveys of burglary victimisation conducted as part of the current research[6] conducted for this evaluation estimated 30% of household burglaries in Manurewa during 2001 and 2003 were not reported to Police.

It is imperative that crime data and analyses presented in this report are interpreted in terms of volumes of Police work, rather than accurate reflections of the true incidence of crime.

In order to conduct comparisons between the Police Area and New Zealand overall, as well as between the four Police Areas in the final report, all the crime data in the reports is presented as rates per 10,000 population, rather than absolute volumes. As an example, in 2002, New Zealand had a total of 60,404 Police-recorded dwelling burglaries, and an estimated resident population of 3,939,000. This translates to a rate of 153.4 recorded dwelling burglaries per 10,000 population, meaning that on average, for every 10,000 residents in New Zealand, 153.4 burglaries were recorded during 2002. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 153 or 154 people out of every 10,000 residents experienced a dwelling burglary during 2002, as some people experienced repeat burglaries.

Several Police key respondents interviewed in the evaluation reported that dwelling burglary victimises whole households, not just individuals. The New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001 also regards dwelling burglary as a crime against households. To reflect dwelling burglary in terms of households, but also enable comparison of dwelling burglary to other (not household-specific) crimes, recorded dwelling burglary data in the reports is presented both as rates per 10,000 population, and rates per 100 households. Using the earlier example, in 2002, New Zealand had a total of 60,404 Police recorded burglaries, and an estimated 1,359,843 occupied dwellings[7]. This translates to a rate of 44.4 recorded dwelling

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[5] Morris, A. and Reilly, J., *New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001*, Ministry of Justice, 2003.

[6] Triggs, S., *Surveys of household burglary Part One (2002): Four Police Areas and national data compared*, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
Triggs, S., *Surveys of household burglary Part Two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004*, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

[7] Statistics New Zealand provided New Zealand Police the number of occupied dwellings in each Police station area as at the 2001 census; however, they were not asked to provide the estimated number of occupied dwellings for the years 1996–2002, as they had done for the usually resident population. Therefore

burglaries per 1,000 households in 2002 for New Zealand, meaning that for every 1,000 households in New Zealand, 44.4 dwelling burglaries were recorded during 2002. Note as previously, this does not necessarily mean that 44 or 45 out of every 1,000 households experienced a burglary during 2002, as some households experienced repeat burglaries.

10.2 Total crime

Figure 10.1 examines the total recorded crime rate per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand from 1997 to 2004. From 1997 to 2003, Lower Hutt had a lower crime rate than New Zealand for the same period. In 2004, Lower Hutt's crime rate was higher than the national rate.

Figure 10.1:   Total crime per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand

Overall, the total crime rate per 10,000 population decreased in Lower Hutt by 7.1% from 1997 to 2004, whereas the national total crime rate decreased by 20.1% for the same period.

Figure 10.2 shows dishonesty offences and the total crime per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand. Dishonesty offences accounted for more than half the total recorded crime per 10,000 population for each of the years 2000 to 2004, both for Lower Hutt and nationally.

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rates of recorded dwelling burglaries per 100 households have only been calculated for the years 2000–2004, with the 2001 census night number of estimated occupied dwellings used for each of these years.

Figure 10.2: **Dishonesty offences and total crime per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand**

Lower Hutt experienced lower rates per 10,000 population for dishonesty offences than New Zealand for each of the years 2000 to 2003, but not for 2004. In Lower Hutt, there was an overall 3.2% increase in dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004, compared to an overall decrease of 14% in the national rate of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004. Total crime increased in Lower Hutt by 6.8% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 9.7% decrease in the national total crime rate per 10,000 population for the same period.

Table 10.1 provides the recorded crime rates per 10,000 population for the remaining offence categories for Lower Hutt and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.3 represents the data graphically.

Table 10.1: **Offence categories (excluding dishonesty) crime rates per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand**

	Rate per 10,000 population									
	Lower Hutt					New Zealand				
Offence category	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Violence	100.2	115.8	124.3	127.2	129.6	107.8	113.4	114.1	113.8	111.4
Sexual offences	7.0	9.8	7.1	6.5	8.2	8.6	8.0	8.9	8.1	7.6
Drugs and antisocial offences	84.2	100.7	95.1	106.9	99.9	138.3	141.8	140.6	146.7	134.1
Property damage	90.3	87.5	85.8	92.4	116.8	105.0	105.0	103.7	108.9	101.8
Property abuses	69.0	77.0	60.2	42.7	40.9	54.7	55.0	55.8	52.2	48.4
Administrative	45.9	88.9	83.5	78.5	48.0	32.8	34.1	36.9	37.2	29.6

Figure 10.3: **Offence categories (excluding dishonesty) crime rates per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand**

Lower Hutt   New Zealand

10.2.1   Recorded violence offences

The rate of recorded violence offences per 10,000 population for Lower Hutt was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2001 to 2004, but not during 2000. The Lower Hutt rate increased by 29.3% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national increase of only 3.3% for the same period.

10.2.2   Recorded sexual offences

The rate of recorded sexual offences per 10,000 population for Lower Hutt was higher than the rate for New Zealand in 2001 and 2004 but lower in 2000, 2002 and 2003. There was an increase of 17.1% in Lower Hutt's rate of recorded sexual offences from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 11.9% from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.3   Recorded drugs and antisocial offences

The rate of recorded drugs and antisocial offences per 10,000 population for Lower Hutt was lower than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004 and increased by 18.7% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 3.0% from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.4 Recorded property damage offences

The rate of recorded property damage offences per 10,000 population in Lower Hutt was lower than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2003 and higher in 2004. There was an increase of 29.3% in Lower Hutt's rate of recorded property damage offences from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 3.1% for the same period.

10.2.5 Recorded property abuse offences

Lower Hutt's rate of recorded property abuses per 10,000 population was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2002 but was lower in 2003 and 2004. There was a marked decrease of 40.7% in Lower Hutt's rate of recorded property abuses from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 11.5% for the same period.

10.2.6 Recorded administrative offences

Lower Hutt's rate of recorded administrative offences was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004 and increased by 4.6% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 9.7% for the same period.

10.3 Dishonesty offences

Table 10.2 provides the recorded crime rates per 10,000 population for particular dishonesty offences for Lower Hutt and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.4 represents the data graphically.

Table 10.2: Dishonesty offences per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand

Selected dishonesty offences	Rate per 10,000 population									
	Lower Hutt					New Zealand				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Burglary	167.0	147.4	137.2	176.9	129.8	172.4	155.5	153.3	153.7	142.0
Unlawful taking/ conversion m/v's	42.1	29.6	52.4	43.2	42.8	57.0	52.1	56.2	54.2	47.9
Remaining car conversion	25.4	22.3	28.3	20.5	18.2	41.0	40.3	42.4	43.2	34.7
Theft ex car	100.1	102.1	134.1	113.5	155.6	121.8	127.8	136.2	132.8	114.9
Theft ex dwelling (no drugs)	12.5	9.5	8.6	7.9	9.1	20.3	20.6	21.2	18.8	14.4
Remaining theft	167.1	165.4	158.8	179.8	183.8	186.9	187.6	186.6	182.7	167.7
Receiving/possessing stolen goods	4.7	5.0	4.4	4.5	8.2	7.1	6.3	6.0	6.2	5.7
Remaining dishonesty offences	31.3	29.5	28.1	29.9	20.5	53.9	51.4	55.5	44.9	39.6

Figure 10.4:   Recorded dishonesty offences per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand

Lower Hutt   New Zealand

10.3.1   Recorded burglary offences

Lower Hutt's rate of recorded burglary offences accounted for 27.5% of Lower Hutt's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004, whereas nationally, burglary accounted for 24.6% of total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004. The recorded burglary rate per 10,000 population was lower in Lower Hutt than in New Zealand in 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004, and was higher in 2003.

The recorded burglary rate per 10,000 population in Lower Hutt decreased by 22.3% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 17.7%.

10.3.2   Recorded car conversion offences

Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles accounted for 7.6% of Lower Hutt's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004 and accounted for 8.5% of the total recorded dishonesty offences in New Zealand for the same period.

The recorded unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles rate per 10,000 population was lower in Lower Hutt than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004 and increased by 1.8% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 15.9%.

Remaining car conversion offence rates per 10,000 population for Lower Hutt decreased markedly by 28.2% from 2000 to 2004, compared to the national rates, which decreased by 15.3% from 2000 to 2004.

10.3.3 Recorded theft offences

Theft offences accounted for 54.7% of Lower Hutt's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004 and accounted for 51.9% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004.

Theft ex car is the offence term for the stealing of property from a car. Theft ex car accounted for 22% of Lower Hutt's total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004, whereas theft ex car accounted for 20% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004. Theft ex car offence rates per 10,000 population for Lower Hutt increased markedly by 55.4%, while the national rates decreased by 5.7% from 2000 to 2004.

Theft ex dwelling offences accounted for 1.7% of Lower Hutt's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Nationally, theft ex dwelling offences accounted for 3.0% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Theft ex dwelling offence rates per 10,000 population for Lower Hutt decreased by 27.4% compared to the national rates, which decreased by 29.1% from 2000 to 2004.

Remaining theft offences[8] accounted for 31.0% of Lower Hutt's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Nationally, remaining theft offences accounted for 28.8% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Remaining theft offence rates (per 10,000 population) for Lower Hutt increased by 10.0%, compared to the national rates which decreased by 10.3% from 2000 to 2004.

10.3.4 Recorded receiving or possessing stolen goods offences

The total recorded number of receiving or possessing stolen goods offences only accounted for a small percentage of the total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004, for both Lower Hutt and New Zealand (1% respectively). Lower Hutt's rate per 10,000 population of receiving or possessing stolen goods offences increased by 74%, compared with the national rates, which decreased by 19.7%, from 2000 to 2004.

10.3.5 Recorded remaining dishonesty offences

Remaining recorded dishonesty offences include receiving drugs, money laundering, financial transaction opportunities and fraud. The total recorded number of remaining dishonesty offences accounted for 5.1% of the total recorded number of dishonesty offences for Lower Hutt from 2000 to 2004 and accounted for 7.7% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Remaining dishonesty offence rates per 10,000 population for Lower Hutt decreased by 34.5%, compared to the national rates, which decreased by 25.7% from 2000 to 2004.

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[8] Remaining theft offences included: theft ex drugs; theft ex shops; theft (pillage); theft ex person; general theft; and theft as servant/misappropriation offences.

10.4 Burglary

Figure 10.5 shows the recorded burglary rate per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand from 1997 to 2004. For both Lower Hutt and New Zealand, there was a decreasing trend in burglary from 1997 to 2002. Overall, from 1997 to 2004, burglary decreased in Lower Hutt by 47.2% and nationally by 33.7%.

Figure 10.5:   Recorded burglary per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand


Figure 10.6 examines recorded burglary in terms of the rates of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population from 1997 to 2004, for Lower Hutt and New Zealand.

Lower Hutt's dwelling burglary rates were higher than the national dwelling burglary rates from 1997 to 2001 and in 2003. There was a 54.3% decrease in dwelling burglary in Lower Hutt from 1997 to 2004, whereas there was a 31.1% decrease in the national dwelling burglary rate from 1997 to 2004. When a comparison is made between 2000 and 2004, dwelling burglary rates in Lower Hutt decreased by 27.6%, whereas nationally, there was a 15.4% decrease.

Non-dwelling burglary rates were lower in Lower Hutt than in New Zealand from 1997 to 2004. There was a 30.5% decrease in Lower Hutt's non-dwelling burglary rates from 1997 to 2004, whereas there was a 37.8% decrease in the national non-dwelling burglary rate from 1997 to 2004. When a comparison is made between 2000 and 2004, non-dwelling burglary rates in Lower Hutt decreased by 12.2%, whereas nationally, there was a decrease of 21.3% from 2000 to 2004.

Figure 10.6: Dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand

Figure 10.7 illustrates monthly and moving averages of recorded dwelling burglary rates per 10,000 population) for the Lower Hutt Police Area and for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Dwelling burglary rates for Lower Hutt (for both monthly and moving averages) were similar to the national rates, although Lower Hutt's rates were periodically higher and lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2004. The trend line for Lower Hutt showed dwelling burglary gradually decreasing from July 2000 to April 2002, gradually increasing from April 2002 to July 2003 and then gradually decreasing again from July 2003 to October 2004. Compared to Lower Hutt, the national recorded monthly and moving average dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population fluctuated less markedly from 2000 to 2004.

Figure 10.7: **Monthly rates and moving averages of recorded dwelling burglary per 10,000 population for Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand**

Monthly rates and moving averages (2000–2004)

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Figure 10.8 examines the rate of dwelling burglary per 100 households for Lower Hutt and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Lower Hutt's rate of recorded dwelling burglary per 100 households was higher than the national rate in 2000, 2001 and 2003.

Figure 10.8:   Rates of dwelling burglary per 100 households for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand[1]

1   The total number of private dwellings as at the 2001 census was used to calculate the rates per 100 households for each of the years 2000 to 2004, as estimates for the 2002, 2003 and 2004 years were not available.

When Lower Hutt's recorded dwelling burglary rate is examined as a rate per 100 households, rather than per 10,000 population, a reduction of 6.5% (versus 8.4% when population based) occurred in 2001, followed by a 17.2% (versus 15.3%) decrease in 2002[9]. A marked increase in Lower Hutt's dwelling burglary rate per 100 households occurred in 2003 (54.1%), whereas there was an increase in the national dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population only in 2003 of 4.4%. There was a marked decrease in Lower Hutt's dwelling burglary rate per 100 households in 2004 of 37.8%, compared to a decrease in the national dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population in 2004 of 7.6%. The national rates (per 100 households) remained relatively stable from 2001 to 2004.

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9   The decrease in Lower Hutt's recorded dwelling burglary experienced per household was less than it was per population in 2001 but more in 2002. This is because the same number of private dwellings was used for both years, whereas the population-based rate used resident population figures estimated for each year, which experienced an increase from 2001 to 2002.

10.5 Clearances

10.5.1   All offences

Table 10.3 provides a comparison of the rate of recorded offences per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for each offence category and total crime for both Lower Hutt and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.9 presents the data about the percentage of recorded crimes cleared graphically.

Figure 10.9:   Percentage of recorded crimes cleared by offence category for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand


Lower Hutt   New Zealand

Table 10.3: **Crime rates per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared by offence category for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand**

Offence category	Lower Hutt *(New Zealand)*									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Violence	100.2	115.8	124.3	127.2	129.6	78.4	80.1	81.6	84.4	86.2
	(107.8)	*(113.4)*	*(114.1)*	*(113.8)*	*(111.4)*	*(76.6)*	*(77.2)*	*(77.8)*	*(79.9)*	*(80.6)*
Sexual offences	7.0	9.8	7.1	6.5	8.2	38.6	47.4	43.7	46.2	58.5
	(8.6)	*(8.0)*	*(8.9)*	*(8.1)*	*(7.6)*	*(53.8)*	*(52.1)*	*(57.2)*	*(56.0)*	*(55.9)*
Drugs and antisocial offences	84.2	100.7	95.1	106.9	99.9	88.3	86.6	88.5	89.5	*94.1*
	(138.3)	*(141.8)*	*(140.6)*	*(146.7)*	*(134.1)*	*(89.6)*	*(88.3)*	*(88.6)*	*(90.5)*	*(91.6)*
Dishonesty	550.1	510.8	552.1	576.3	568.1	24.4	23.7	22.0	27.7	27.2
	(660.4)	*(641.6)*	*(657.3)*	*(636.8)*	*(567.8)*	*(22.6)*	*(22.7)*	*(22.5)*	*(23.1)*	*(23.8)*
Property damage	90.3	87.5	85.8	92.4	116.8	35.2	37.4	32.1	36.7	37.0
	(105.0)	*(105.0)*	*(103.7)*	*(108.9)*	*(101.8)*	*(31.4)*	*(31.2)*	*(30.3)*	*(31.1)*	*(31.6)*
Property abuses	69.0	77.0	60.2	42.7	40.9	36.1	35.8	41.9	61.6	72.5
	(54.7)	*(55.0)*	*(55.8)*	*(52.2)*	*(48.4)*	*(68.3)*	*(67.3)*	*(69.0)*	*(72.5)*	*(73.2)*
Administrative	45.9	88.9	83.5	78.5	48.0	77.9	71.6	75.3	81.5	90.5
	(32.8)	*(34.1)*	*(36.9)*	*(37.2)*	*(29.6)*	*(85.8)*	*(84.3)*	*(86.3)*	*(88.6)*	*(91.4)*
Total crime	946.7	990.5	1008.1	1030.5	1011.6	40.4	43.4	42.2	47.5	47.6
	(1107.6)	*(1099.0)*	*(1117.4)*	*(1103.7)*	*(1000.5)*	*(41.4)*	*(42.0)*	*(41.9)*	*(43.5)*	*(44.6)*

Lower Hutt had lower recorded rates of total crime per 10,000 population than New Zealand from 2000 to 2003. The total clearance rate for Lower Hutt was higher than the national rate from 2001 to 2004.

10.5.1.1 Recorded clearances for violence offences

Recorded clearance rates for violence offences were higher in Lower Hutt compared to New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Overall, clearance rates in Lower Hutt increased from 2000 to 2004 by 9.9%, whereas nationally, there was a 5.2% increase in clearance rates for the same period.

10.5.1.2 Recorded clearances for sexual offences

Recorded clearance rates for sexual offences in Lower Hutt were lower than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2003 but were higher in 2004. Overall, clearance rates in Lower Hutt increased markedly from 2000 to 2004 by 51.8%, whereas nationally there was a 3.9% increase in clearance rates for the same period.

10.5.1.3 Recorded clearances for drugs and antisocial offences

Recorded clearance rates were lower in Lower Hutt than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2003 but were higher in 2004. Overall, clearance rates in Lower Hutt increased from 2000 to 2004 by 6.6%, whereas nationally there was a 2.3% increase in clearance rates for the same period.

10.5.1.4 Recorded clearances for dishonesty offences

Recorded clearance rates for dishonesty offences were higher in Lower Hutt than in New Zealand in 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 but were lower in 2002. In Lower Hutt, clearance rates increased from 2000 to 2004 by 11.5%. Nationally, the rate of recorded clearances increased by 5.3% from 2000 to 2004.

10.5.1.5 Recorded clearances for property damage offences

Recorded clearance rates for property damage offences in Lower Hutt were higher than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. In Lower Hutt, clearance rates increased slightly from 2000 to 2004, by 5.1%. Nationally, there was very little change in the clearance rates between 2000 and 2004.

10.5.1.6 Recorded clearances for property abuse offences

Recorded clearance rates for property abuse offences in Lower Hutt were lower than those in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. In Lower Hutt, clearance rates increased markedly from 2000 to 2004, by 101.1%. National clearance rates increased by 7.2% from 2000 to 2004.

10.5.1.7 Recorded clearances for administrative offences

Recorded clearance rates for administrative offences were lower in Lower Hutt than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. In Lower Hutt, clearance rates increased from 2000 to 2004 by 16.2%. Nationally, clearance rates increased by 6.5% between 2000 and 2004.

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10.5.2   Dishonesty offenses

Table 10.4 provides a comparison of the rate of recorded offences per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for particular dishonesty offences for Lower Hutt and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.10 presents the data on the percentage of recorded crimes cleared graphically.

Figure 10.10:   Percentage of recorded dishonesty crimes cleared for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand

Table 10.4: **Dishonesty offences crime rates per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand**

Selected dishonesty offences	Lower Hutt (New Zealand)									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Burglary	167.0	147.4	137.2	176.9	129.8	17.4	12.1	13.7	17.5	18.5
	(172.4)	(155.5)	(153.3)	(153.7)	(142.0)	(15.8)	(16.0)	(15.9)	(16.5)	(17.3)
Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles	42.1	29.6	52.4	43.2	42.8	14.4	21.8	20.3	19.9	23.3
	(57.0)	(52.1)	(56.2)	(54.2)	(47.9)	(16.9)	(18.8)	(19.4)	(20.3)	(20.1)
Remaining car conversion	25.4	22.3	28.3	20.5	18.2	36.9	43.9	25.9	43.4	44.8
	(41.0)	(40.3)	(42.4)	(43.2)	(34.7)	(22.3)	(22.6)	(25.0)	(25.9)	(25.5)
Theft ex car	100.1	102.1	134.1	113.5	155.6	5.4	5.3	6.4	10.0	8.5
	(121.8)	(127.8)	(136.2)	(132.8)	(114.9)	(6.4)	(6.6)	(7.3)	(8.0)	(7.5)
Theft ex dwelling	12.5	9.5	8.6	7.9	9.1	16.8	18.1	14.0	29.1	20.9
	(20.3)	(20.6)	(21.2)	(18.8)	(14.4)	(13.8)	(13.3)	(13.0)	(13.7)	(13.4)
Remaining theft	167.1	165.4	158.8	179.8	183.8	37.5	37.7	36.1	42.5	44.7
	(186.9)	(187.6)	(186.6)	(182.7)	(167.7)	(33.1)	(32.8)	(32.0)	(32.4)	(34.4)
Remaining dishonesty offences	36.0	34.5	32.5	34.4	28.7	53.9	50.0	53.7	60.5	53.1
	(61.0)	(57.7)	(61.5)	(51.1)	(45.3)	(50.9)	(50.4)	(48.6)	(53.3)	(52.1)

Clearance rates in Lower Hutt for remaining car conversion offences, theft ex dwelling offences and remaining theft offences were higher than national rates from 2000 to 2004 (as were remaining dishonesty offences except during 2001). Burglary clearance rates were higher in Lower Hutt than the national rates during 2000, 2003 and 2004 but were lower in 2001 and 2002. Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicle clearance rates were higher in Lower Hutt than the national rates during 2001, 2002 and 2004 but were lower in 2000 and 2003. Theft ex car clearance rates were lower in Lower Hutt than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2002 but were higher in 2003 and 2004.

10.5.2.1   Recorded clearances for burglary offences

There was an increase in burglary clearances in Lower Hutt from 2000 to 2004 of 6.5% compared to a 9.5% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

10.5.2.2   Recorded clearances for car conversion offences

Lower Hutt's rate of recorded clearances for unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicle offences were higher than the national rates during 2001, 2002 and 2004 but were lower in 2000 and 2003. There was a 62% increase in clearance rates from 2000 to 2004, compared to an 18.9% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

Lower Hutt's rate of recorded clearances for remaining car conversion offences was higher than the national rates from 2000 to 2004. There was an increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004 of 21.4%, compared to a 14.3% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

10.5.2.3   Recorded clearances for theft offences

Lower Hutt's rates of recorded clearances for theft ex car offences were lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2002 and were higher than the national rates in 2003 and 2004. There was a 57.4% increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 17.1% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

Lower Hutt's rates of recorded clearances for theft ex dwelling offences were higher than the national rates from 2000 to 2004. There was a 24.3% increase in Lower Hutt's clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 2.9% decrease in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

Lower Hutt's rates of recorded clearances for remaining theft offences were higher than the national rates from 2000 to 2004. There was a 19.1% increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 3.9% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

### 10.5.2.4   Recorded clearances for remaining dishonesty offences

Lower Hutt's rates of recorded clearances for remaining dishonesty offences were higher than the national rates from 2000 to 2004, except during 2003, when they were slightly lower than the national rates, and there was a 1.5% decrease in clearance rates from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 2.3% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

10.5.3 Burglary offenses

Table 10.5 provides a comparison of the rate of recorded burglary in terms of the rates of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for Lower Hutt and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.11 presents the data for the percentage of cleared dwelling and non-dwelling burglaries graphically.

Figure 10.11:   Percentage of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand

Lower Hutt's recorded clearance rates for dwelling burglary were higher than the national rates in 2000 and from 2003 to 2004 but were lower in 2001 and 2002. Non-dwelling burglary clearance rates in Lower Hutt were higher than the national rates in 2000, 2001 and 2004 but lower during 2002 and 2003. Lower Hutt's recorded clearance rate for dwelling burglary was higher than that for non-dwelling burglary in 2003 but was lower from 2000 to 2002 and in 2004. Nationally, dwelling burglary clearance rates were lower than non-dwelling burglary clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

Lower Hutt's recorded clearance rate for dwelling burglary decreased by 2.5% from 2000 to 2004, whilst the non-dwelling burglary clearance rate increased by 19.3% from 2000 to 2004. The national recorded clearance rate for dwelling burglary increased by 6.5% from 2000 to 2004, whilst the non-dwelling burglary rate increased by 13.1% from 2000 to 2004.

Table 10.5: Dwelling and non-dwelling burglary rates per 10,000 population and percentage of dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for the Lower Hutt Police Area and New Zealand.

Burglary	Lower Hutt (New Zealand)									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Dwelling burglary	109.0	99.8	84.5	124.5	78.9	17.1	9.1	12.2	19.2	16.7
	(106.3)	(93.4)	(93.2)	(97.3)	(89.9)	(15.3)	(15.7)	(15.2)	(16.0)	(16.3)
Non-dwelling burglary	58.0	47.6	52.7	52.4	50.9	17.9	18.4	16.0	13.4	21.3
	(66.2)	(62.1)	(60.1)	(56.4)	(52.1)	(16.7)	(16.6)	(17.0)	(17.4)	(18.9)

10.6 Prosecutions, convictions and sentences

Figure 10.12 shows outcomes of burglary prosecutions in the Lower Hutt Police Area from 1997 to 2004 as a percentage of charges laid. The percentage of prosecutions resulting in convictions decreased from 82% in 1997 to 56.5% in 2004. The percentage of prosecutions that were not proved increased from 18% charges laid in 1997 to 43.5% in 2004. Prosecutions that were discharged without conviction and other prosecutions from 1997 to 2004 were a relatively small percentage of charges laid.

Figure 10.12:   Outcomes of burglary prosecutions in the Lower Hutt District Court from 1997 to 2004, as a percentage of charges laid[1, 2]


1   The outcomes of burglary prosecutions labelled 'Not proved' were comprised of 'Dismissed', 'Discharged', 'Withdrawn', 'Acquitted' and 'Other not proved' prosecution outcomes.
2   This data was obtained from the Case Monitoring Subsystem of the Law Enforcement System. This subsystem recorded the court processing of charges. A database has been established consisting of depersonalised information that has been extracted from the Case Monitoring Subsystem.
Every offence for which an offender is apprehended can result in a 'charge' (or prosecution) being laid. For example, if a person is apprehended for having committed two burglaries and one assault then this may result in three separate charges being laid against the person. The analysis was based on individual charges using the Final Court Hearing Date to ensure that every charge laid was finalised. For example, a charge might be laid in 2004 but not be finalised in court until 2005.

Figure 10.13 shows the number of convictions for burglary in the Lower Hutt District Court and in the New Zealand District and High Courts from 1997 to 2004. National burglary convictions were trending down from 2000 to 2003 but increased in 2004. Overall, there was a 4.1%

decrease in national burglary convictions from 1997 to 2004. The number of burglary convictions in the Lower Hutt District Court from 1997 to 2004 decreased by 38.7%.

Figure 10.13: Number of burglary convictions in the Lower Hutt District Court and in the New Zealand District and High Courts from 1997 to 2004[1, 2]

1   This data was obtained from the Case Monitoring Subsystem of the Law Enforcement System. This subsystem recorded the court processing of charges. A database has been established consisting of depersonalised information that has been extracted from the Case Monitoring Subsystem.
     Every offence for which an offender is apprehended can result in a 'charge' (or prosecution being laid). For example, if a person is apprehended for having committed two burglaries and one assault then this may result in three separate charges being laid against the person.
     The analysis was based on individual charges using the Final Court Hearing Date to ensure that every charge laid was finalised. For example, a charge might be laid in 2004 but not be finalised in court until 2005.
2   Convictions in the Lower Hutt District Court are generally representative of offences committed in the Lower Hutt Police Area.

Figure 10.14 shows sentences imposed for burglary offences in the Lower Hutt Police Area from 1997 to 2004 as a percentage of cases. The percentage of community-based sentences increased from 1997 to 2004. The percentage of custodial sentences gradually decreased from 1997 to 2004. The percentage of monetary sentences decreased from 1997 to 2004. The percentage of other types of sentences showed little change from 1997 to 2004.

Figure 10.14:   Sentences imposed for burglary offences in the Lower Hutt District Court from 1997 to 2004 as a percentage of cases involving burglary[1, 2]

[1]   The types of sentences imposed were: custodial (life imprisonment, preventive detention, imprisonment or corrective training); community (community work, periodic detention, community service, community programme or supervision); monetary (fines or reparation); and other sentences (e.g., a conviction and discharge, or an order to come up for sentence if called upon).

[2]   In general terms, a 'case' in this report is defined as all charges being dealt with against an offender at the same point in time. For example, in a case that involves more than one charge, the charge taken to represent the case is the one that resulted in the most serious penalty.

10.7 Summary and discussion

In the Lower Hutt Police Area, the rate of recorded dwelling burglary decreased by 13% more than the decrease in the national rate from 2000 to 2004.   This suggests that at least some of the reduction in recorded dwelling burglary may be attributed to the specific burglary reduction initiatives put in place in Lower Hutt over the period.

Over the same period in Lower Hutt, the rates of theft ex car, remaining theft and property damage increased while the national rates decreased. Recorded violent and drugs and antisocial offences increased at a greater rate in Lower Hutt than was the trend nationally. The trends in other property offence types, such as non dwelling burglary, car conversion and theft ex dwelling, were similar in Lower Hutt to national trends. These findings suggest there may have been some displacement from dwelling burglary to theft from cars, other theft and property damage in the Lower Hutt Police Area during the period.

While the proportion of clearances for dwelling burglary decreased in Lower Hutt for 2000 to 2004 (compared with an increase nationally), clearances for other offence types, such as non dwelling burglary, theft ex dwelling, theft ex car, other theft and car conversion, increased substantially more than they did nationally.

Convictions as a proportion of charges prosecuted and the total number of convictions for burglary showed a decreasing trend both in the Lower Hutt Court District and nationally from 1997 to 2004. The proportion of custodial sentences for burglary cases also showed a decreasing trend both in the Lower Hutt Court District and nationally.

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11 Perceived effectiveness of the overall burglary reduction effort

11.1 The overall burglary reduction effort

The purpose of this case study is to describe the strategies and tactics used by Police to reduce dwelling burglary in Lower Hutt from 2002 to 2004.

In Lower Hutt, directed patrolling, targeting known offenders, using maps to illustrate the geographical distribution of recent crime, bail and curfew checks, liaison with second-hand dealers, collection of DNA and fingerprints, SOCO and the Q-car were all used throughout the evaluation period. Furthermore, the CSM—a key position in burglary reduction—the Crime Meeting, and the TRG, widely considered to be the proactive arm of Lower Hutt's burglary reduction efforts, were also in place throughout the evaluation period. For this reason, this report only notes the introduction and, where relevant, the cessation of initiatives clearly designed to reduce burglary.

The approach to burglary reduction in Lower Hutt in 2002 was characterised by an increased analysis of Police Intel. Tactics produced a wide range of information which included:

- directed patrolling reports tailored to each shift
- maps of recent crime
- profiles of known offenders
- curfew sheets outlining offenders' bail conditions
- analysis of burglary files.

Tactics also sought as many opportunities as possible for communicating information to frontline staff. As well as being key providers of information at the weekly crime meeting, Tactics attended fall-ins for most shifts, regularly updated information on display boards around the station, communicated with staff through email and was available to attend meetings.

In 2003, the Crime Focus was introduced as a new initiative to combat burglary and other crimes. The Crime Focus involved identifying a particular type of criminal activity to be the focus for a two-week period, and requiring all officers from constables to the Area Controller to make some form of contribution to reducing that type of crime. The rationale was that all officers could make a contribution to reducing the focus crime on top of their usual duties. Tactics was central

to the identification of the Crime Focus, and tailored much of the information they produced to addressing the focus. In the two-week period when the Crime Focus was burglary, the number of dwelling burglaries was well down on previous figures. However, when the focus changed to another type of crime burglary rates rose again.

Another 2003 development was the YSS. Young people had been identified as making a significant contribution to dwelling burglaries, and the YSS was an attempt to maximise the contribution of the resources dedicated to young offenders, and to manage youth crime more proactively. Although the YSS was an important plank of the burglary reduction strategy in 2003, it highlighted the need for structural changes among youth services staff, and it was acknowledged that the full contribution of the YSS to burglary reduction would not be seen for some time.

In response to high rates of dwelling burglary in the second half of 2003, Lower Hutt Police looked for other ways to combat the problem. After looking at what other Areas and Districts were doing, in August 2004 Lower Hutt Police Area introduced Hutt Crim. Hutt Crim retained a whole-of-station approach to crime reduction, a characteristic of the Crime Focus, but introduced greater focus, urgency and accountability to policing priorities by giving individuals and sections responsibility for specific tasks for which they then became accountable. Hutt Crim relied strongly on Tactics providing up-to-date, accurate and comprehensive information about recent criminal activity and active offenders. Hutt Crim had been only partially introduced at the end of the evaluation period, with the crime forecasting component of the model yet to be implemented.

Figure 11.1 attempts to match the major burglary reduction strategies in Lower Hutt against crime data for the years 2002 to 2004 to see whether there was any obvious correlation between particular Police initiatives and rates of dwelling burglary. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from such a matching exercise as crime rates are influenced by a range of factors, and many policing tactics were used throughout the evaluation period, more and less intensively, and in different configurations.

Figure 11.1:   Initiatives and strategies within Lower Hutt Police Area matched with crime data

Crime Strategy Manager position created

Staff shortages

Crime Focus

Staged introduction of Crime and Crash Reduction Intelligence Model begins

Tactical Response Group established

Proactive weeks
Bail checks
Targeting offenders
Directed patrolling

Youth Services Strategy taking shape

Rate per 10,000 population

Lower Hutt
New Zealand
3 per. Mov. Avg. (Lower Hutt)
3 per. Mov. Avg. (New Zealand)

11.2 Perceptions of the overall burglary reduction effort

11.2.1 Police perceptions

All of the Police interviewed in 2002 were convinced of the effectiveness of the burglary reduction effort in 2000 and 2001 in reducing reported dwelling burglaries. All were aware of the burglary statistics week by week and had seen a dramatic fall in numbers of burglaries in the two years that the strategy had been developed and implemented.

It was evident from interviews that the Area was struggling to sustain the burglary reduction effort during 2002. Those interviewed believed that 2000 and 2001 had seen the strategy working at its best and achieving results in terms of reduced dwelling burglaries. However, several factors had impacted on the Area's ability to give burglary the primary focus it had been given earlier. It became more difficult to find sufficient staff to implement some of the key initiatives. While the authorised complement of staff had increased, staff absences were high due to leave, sickness, and later, staff secondment to the Auckland region. The Area had dealt with several serious and high-profile cases during 2002, including murder, kidnapping, and extortion. These were tying staff up in ongoing investigation and accumulated leave.

In 2003, the Area Controller and other staff expressed frustration that despite a concerted effort directed towards reducing burglary, the number of domestic burglaries was beginning to rise again following some rewarding reductions towards the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003. Staffing levels were stretched by illness and temporary redeployment—most notably to the America's Cup. A sense of despondence about burglary was evident at both Area and District levels about the increase in burglary across the District as a whole, despite an increase in both arrests and clearances for burglary.

In 2004, there was a sense of optimism in Lower Hutt Police Area as the number of dwelling burglaries once again started to decline. While there was general enthusiasm for the new Hutt Crim, Police interviewed were also aware that the Area had worked equally hard at burglary reduction the previous year, under the Crime Focus, and the results had been less than rewarding. This left questions in the minds of some officers as to what was causing the reduction in dwelling burglaries seen in 2004.

11.2.2 Public perceptions

Household Surveys (2002, 2004)

When asked 'What Police or community activities which aim to reduce burglary in your neighbourhood are you aware of?', 38% didn't know of any activities. The main types of activity respondents mentioned in 2002 were:

- Neighbourhood Watch/Support (49%) (a significantly greater proportion than the average of the other areas)
- Police patrols (13%)
- Community constable (9%).

The picture was much the same in the 2004 survey. A lower proportion of participants (40%) indicated awareness of Neighbourhood Support, but an additional 12% mentioned 'informal neighbourhood network' (an option not available in the 2002 survey). Awareness of Police patrols had increased to 17%. However, the proportion of respondents who didn't know of any Police or community activities which aimed to reduce burglary had risen slightly, to 42%.

In 2002, 54% of Lower Hutt respondents answered 'yes' when asked 'Is there anything that you would you like the Police to do to make you feel safer from burglary?' compared to 39% 'No' and 7% 'Don't know'. In 2004, the proportions had changed significantly, with 46% answering 'yes', 45% answering 'no', and 9% who didn't know.

Of those who answered 'yes', the most common things mentioned that the Police to could do to make residents feel safer from burglary were:

- more visibility/patrolling (65% in 2002, 59% in 2004)
- more staff (24% in 2002, 16% in 2004)
- more Police/time assigned to burglary (19% in 2002, 16% in 2004).

In 2004, 19% also suggested faster response time when burglary was reported—this option was not available in the 2002 survey.

11.3 Strengths of the overall burglary reduction effort

During interviews Police identified an integrated approach, strong leadership, performance management, and openness to new strategies as strengths to the overall burglary reduction effort in Lower Hutt. Some structures and initiatives, such as the Tactical Response Group, the Intel work and Neighbourhood Support, were also seen as strengths, and these are discussed in detail in other parts of this report.

11.3.1   An integrated approach

This was seen as a strength of the approach in Lower Hutt. Every section in the Area, including for example the road traffic unit, was aware of the burglary reduction strategy and their role in it. The integrated approach was fostered through the crime meeting and the central role played by the Tactics section in providing information, direction, and coordination to the burglary effort. This meant that individual sections were not left to try different strategies in isolation from each other, and units were aware of the role others were playing. The Intel units were central to the coordination of effort within the District also.

11.3.2   Leadership

Respect for the Area Controller and his leadership style was apparent through the interviews conducted for this evaluation. This was true for both respondents within the Police and those in the community. Elements of his leadership style that Police officers particularly respected were that he:

- engendered a strong sense of Lower Hutt Police being a team, and himself as part of that team
- had wide experience in the Police and understood the realities of Police work on the ground
- demanded a high level of performance from all team members
- was both accessible and approachable, creating no sense of a division between management and other staff.

The senior management team as a whole was perceived by other officers as providing effective leadership to the Lower Hutt Police.

11.3.3   Performance management

The performance management system at both District and Area level was seen as an important factor in holding staff accountable and providing feedback for their contribution to the burglary reduction effort as well as other priority areas. At District level, the reporting on weekly crime targets had led to Area Controllers seeking and sharing information on initiatives that are found to be effective.

11.3.4   Openness to new strategies

Throughout the evaluation period, the senior management team were looking for new ideas and strategies that could be implemented in Lower Hutt to reduce dwelling burglary and other crime. They kept abreast of what was happening throughout the country, and on a number of occasions sent personnel to other Police Areas to observe practice and see what could be learned.

11.4 Barriers to the overall burglary reduction effort

Throughout the evaluation period, Police identified understaffing, competing demands from other priorities, the quality of service from Comms, and inadequate sentences given to burglars as barriers to the burglary reduction effort in Lower Hutt.

11.4.1 Staffing

All Police interviewed referred to ongoing staffing difficulties.   These were particularly acute during some data-collection visits. At District level, the staffing complement was reduced by commitments to national policing in areas such as:

- the Diplomatic Protection Squad
- the National Dive Squad
- the Police Training College
- overseas commitments such as East Timor
- assistance to other Districts
- national security operations
- secondments to the Office of the Commissioner.

These commitments reduce staffing available at Area level. In the Area, leave and sickness are a significant drain on staffing. Staff turnover has an important impact, as often staff leaving are highly experienced and the replacements are officers with little experience.

11.4.2 Competing demands

Lower Hutt was seen as an Area with a large amount of serious crime, such as drug inquiries, murder, and aggravated robbery, which always took priority over burglary. For this reason, until 2004 the CIB was largely unutilised for burglary investigation, and although a Property Squad existed, personnel were invariably diverted to larger operations. Road traffic policing was another area that consistently took priority over burglary. All GDB units struggled to keep up the monthly traffic hours to the point that whole shifts could be devoted to this.

11.4.3 Communications Centre

Lower Hutt staff believed that the quality of service from Comms was a significant barrier to apprehending burglars and giving a quality service to victims. Lack of local knowledge and the inexperience of some call takers were thought to be the main reasons.

11.4.4 Sentencing practice

Most Police believed the burglary reduction effort was hampered by light sentences handed down by the courts for burglary and the return of recidivist burglars to the community. In 2003, the increasing number of successful applications for home detention was criticised by some Police, who believed the sentence did not always curtail criminal activity.